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Executive Summary 
Many people are concerned that information about their private life is more readily 
available and more easily captured on the Internet as compared to offline technologies. Specific 
concerns include unwanted email, credit card fraud, identity theft, and harassment.  
This paper analyzes key issues surrounding the protection of online privacy. It makes 
three important contributions: First, it provides the most comprehensive assessment to date of 
the estimated benefits and costs of regulating online privacy. Second, it provides the most 
comprehensive evaluation of legislation and legislative proposals in the U.S. aimed at 
protecting online privacy.  Finally, it offers some policy prescriptions for the regulation  of 
online privacy and suggests areas for future research. 
After analyzing the current debate on online privacy and assessing the potential costs 
and benefits of proposed regulations, our specific recommendations concerning the 
government’s involvement in protecting online privacy include the following:  
•  The government should fund research that evaluates the effectiveness of existing 
privacy legislation before considering new regulations. 
•  The government should not generally regulate matters of privacy differently 
based on whether an issue arises online or offline.  
•  The government should not require a Web site to provide notification of its 
privacy policy because the vast majority of commercial U.S.-based Web sites 
already do so.  
•  The government should distinguish between how it regulates the use and 
dissemination of highly sensitive information, such as certain health records or 
Social Security numbers, versus more general information, such as consumer 
name and purchasing habits.  
•  The government should not require companies to provide consumers broad 
access to the personal information that is collected online for marketing 
purposes because the benefits do not appear to be significant and the costs could 
be quite high. 
•  The government should make it easier for the public to obtain information on 
online privacy and the tools available for consumers to protect their own 
privacy.  
The message of this paper is not that online privacy should be unregulated, but rather 
that policy makers should think through their options carefully, weighing the likely costs and
benefits of each proposal. 
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                                 The Benefits and Costs of Online Privacy Legislation
                   Robert W. Hahn and Anne Layne-Farrar 
I.  Introduction: What is Privacy and How is it Protected? 
The right to privacy has attracted attention and stimulated debate for a very long time.
1 
Recently, the Internet has added new urgency to the privacy debate.
2 Many people are 
concerned that information about their private life is readily available to a wider public with the 
growth of the World Wide Web. Specific concerns include credit card fraud, identity theft, 
“spam” (unwanted email solicitations), and general harassment.  
There has been a more vigorous debate over the extent to which individuals have a right 
to keep particular information private––ranging from medical records to information on where 
people live. There has also been a debate over the extent to which businesses should be allowed 
to collect information on consumers without their express consent. 
By lowering the costs of searching for, collecting, combining, and storing information, 
the Internet has heightened the probability of information privacy problems. At the same time, 
it has raised the potential for gains to consumers and businesses through the more efficient 
marketing and distribution of products and services.  
In this paper, we analyze several key issues surrounding the protection of online 
privacy. The paper makes three important contributions: First, it provides the m ost 
comprehensive assessment to date of the estimated benefits and costs of regulating online 
privacy; second, it provides the most comprehensive evaluation of legislation and legislative 
proposals in the U.S. aimed at protecting online privacy.  Finally,  it offers some policy 
prescriptions for the regulation of online privacy and suggests areas for future research. 
We focus our analysis on the potential costs and benefits associated with legislation 
protecting information privacy in a networked world. Individuals could benefit from 
government regulation of privacy, but these benefits should be balanced against higher costs for 
businesses in the efficient use of personal information and higher costs to society from 
                                                 
1 For a seminal law review article, see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890). 
2 See § II for a review of the literature.  
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restricting the flow of information.
3 We focus on the information privacy of individuals and the 
uses of information by commercial entities, but we do not examine how the government 
infringes on the privacy of individuals.
4  
Before addressing the debate on information privacy, we need to establish some 
common terminology. We therefore examine some of the ways that privacy and its protection 
can be defined. Section II then reviews the information privacy debate, with a particular 
emphasis on the arguments in favor of and against some kind of government intervention. The 
literature review highlights a key question: how well is information privacy protected today? 
Section III considers the effectiveness of the current laws enacted (in the U.S. at the state and 
federal level, as well as in Europe); we also assess the technological tools available for 
individual privacy protection. Section IV reviews proposed information privacy legislation in 
the U.S. and discusses its implications, paying particular attention to quantifiable costs and 
benefits associated with this legislation. Section V presents our recommendations concerning 
information privacy legislation and suggests areas for future research.  
A.  Defining Privacy 
Information privacy has been defined in several ways,
5 which makes it difficult to 
address the subject in a straightforward manner. Most definitions include a person’s “right” to 
his or her own information, where that information can be anything from a name and address to 
health and financial records. For example, privacy can be defined as the right to be left alone. 
In the context of the Internet, this could be interpreted as the right to refuse unwanted email or 
online solicitations. Confidentiality is another aspect of privacy––the right to protect secrets, 
however “secret” might itself be defined. Some people also view anonymity as a privacy right. 
Individuals should be able to conduct certain types of transactions online without identifying 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Peter J. Wallison, When Privacy Is a Credit Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 24, 2001, at A23.  
4 Phillipa Jeffery, Keeping Big Brother From Watching You: Privacy in the Internet Age, L OOKING G LASS 
REPORTS (Citizens Against Government Waste, Washington, D.C.), 2001 (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.cagw.org/publications/lookinglass/pubs.looking.privacy.htm >; See also the discussion of federal 
laws limiting government privacy invasions in FRED CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE ch. 5 (1997). 
5 Many authors have grappled with the issue of defining privacy. Here, we highlight those definitions that are most 
relevant for a discussion of online privacy legislation. For a good review of proposed definitions of privacy, see 
id. at 19-22; and, Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STANFORD L. REV. 1193, 
1202-1212 (1998).   
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themselves.
6 Each of these definitions involves personal control: control over others’ access to 
you; control over disclosure of your information; and control over your “public” appearance on 
the Internet.
7  
Other definitions of privacy pertain to personal safety and security.
8 For example, the 
right to bar intrusion on private physical property (like your home) can be extended to the 
Internet if we define technological space. This might include barring access to your hard disk 
files or your email account, either on-location or surreptitious remote access. Information 
privacy can also be defined as a right to guard against the misuse of personal information. An 
example of this would be credit card fraud, where a thief steals your card number and name to 
make illegal purchases.
9  
                                                 
6 According to the World Wide Web Consortium, an international organization also known as W3C, “Anonymity 
is essential to protect free speech. It can be used to protect human rights workers reporting abuses, political 
dissidents commenting on government actions, writers publishing controversial literature and other important 
functions where revealing a person's identity would threaten a person's life or well-being. Anonymous 
publishing has been recognized in the United States as being protected by the First Amendment.” See Global 
Internet Liberty Campaign,  W3  – Anonymous Remailer (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.gilc.org/speech/anonymous/remailer.html>. The W3C is comprised of over 500 member 
companies devoted to developing standards and protocols for the World Wide Web ( see World Wide Web 
Consortium (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.w3.org/Consortium/ > for more information). Others, however, 
have argued that a call for anonymity may well mask illicit intent. Making identity knowable can curb less 
desirable behavior, like the dissemination of child pornography. See L AWRENCE L ESSIG, C ODE  AND O THER 
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). A more recent concern regarding anonymity stems from the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks. The fear is that terrorist can use technology to mask their identities and activities. See Peter 
Lewis, The Tools of Freedom and Security Information is the Key to Winning the War on Terror. But Some of 
That Information May Be About You, FORTUNE MAG. , Oct. 19, 2001, at 195. 
7 There is some uncertainty regarding whether certain aspects of the Internet are public or private. Some online 
forum, like chat rooms and bulletin boards are clearly public. Others, like general browsing or shopping are less 
clear.  
8 Some regulation proponents point to a lack of trust between consumers and commercial enterprises online as 
evidence that the federal government should intervene. Without federal rules, commerce on the Internet will not 
reach its full potential because consumers will not trust Web sites with sensitive information like credit card 
numbers. See Joel R. Reidenberg & Francoise Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of Privacy and Confidence in 
the Network, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105 (1995).  The concern, however, does not seem justified given the 
tremendous growth in e -commerce. For example, credit card transactions online grew from 4.9 million 
transactions in 1997 to 9.3 million in 1998 and rose to 19.2 million by the third quarter of 1999. See JIM HARPER 
& SOLVEIG SINGLETON, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST ., WITH A GRAIN OF SALT, WHAT CONSUMER PRIVACY 
SURVEYS D ON’T T ELL U S 8 (Jun. 1, 2001). As another example, Consumers International cites a survey 
conducted by Forrester research that estimates US business to consumer Internet sales will reach $108 billion (in 
USD) by 2002.  See C ONSUMERS I NT’L, P RIVACY@NET, A N I NTERNATIONAL C OMPARATIVE S TUDY  OF 
CONSUMER PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 11 (Jan. 2001). (Note that Consumers International does not provide 
citation details on the Forrester survey).  
9 This definition points to what has been a source of confusion and ambiguity in the debate on information privacy: 
credit card theft is a far different concern than unwanted email (often referred to as spam). Identity theft and 
credit card fraud are illegal today, even in an online context. While spam can be annoying and even costly (as 
we discuss below), most people would not give it the same weight as identity theft or credit card fraud. (For 
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Perhaps the broadest definition casts personal information as private property. Thus, all 
of the property rights associated with physical property would apply to personal information. 
Under this characterization, the individual controls what, how, and when personal information 
is disclosed, used, and disseminated by others. At first glance, this might seem a reasonable 
demand––after all the information is about you so you should control it. But consider the 
implications: if you own the property rights to all of your personal information, people could 
not gossip about you, newspapers could not report your name or activities, and credit bureaus 
could not even supply your credit report to lenders without your explicit approval. As we shall 
see below in the literature review section, this “right” is a crucial underpinning for several of 
the privacy protection arguments, in particular those calling for strong federal regulation of 
online privacy.  
An important question underlying the preceding definitions is whether legal scholars 
can agree that individuals have an information privacy right. Our reading of the literature finds 
that, like many aspects of privacy, there is no consensus on this issue.
10 The ACLU evidently 
backs information privacy as a property right.
11 So do many legal scholars, such as Jerry 
Kang.
12 On the other side of the dispute, Jessica Litman argues that tort law is too narrow to 
grant this right because “it protects personal data from disclosure only when it conveys 
embarrassing personal information.”
13 Litman further argues that property rights in personal 
information are “inconsistent with much of our First Amendment jurisprudence.”
14 Fred Cate 
agrees, writing “the U.S. Constitution, then, offers little support for information privacy …The 
Supreme Court has crafted a limited framework for protecting individuals’ right to privacy in 
the context of government activities concerning personal information and no support at all for 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
information on the 42 state-level identity theft laws, see Fed. Trade Commission, Identity Theft: State Laws 
(visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/statelaw.htm>. For information on the federal identity 
theft law, see Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (1998) (visited Sep. 4, 
2001) <http://www.identitytheft.org/title18.htm>.  
10 We defer to legal scholars when considering this question. Here, we present a cursory review of the literature. 
11 For a description of the ACLU’s campaign, see Ira Glasser, The ACLU Launches a Campaign to Protect Your 
Privacy, ACLU SPOTLIGHT (Spr. 1997). Also see Am. Civ. Liberties Union, The Year in Civil Liberties, 1997 
(visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.aclu.org/library/97review.html#privacy>. 
12 Kang, supra note 5. 
13 Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STANFORD L. REV. 1283 (2000). 
14 Id. at 1294. She cites numerous legal decisions and legislation supporting the notion that information privacy 
rights have only limited and qualified support.  
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privacy rights outside of the public sector.”
15 We defer to the legal experts on defining such 
“rights,” but we do examine the practical implications of information property rights in the 
literature review.  
B.  Defining Privacy Protection 
There are many important elements in defining the protection of privacy. The 
fundamentals of information privacy protection are nicely summarized in the Fair Information 
Practices defined by the Federal Trade Commission.
16 The five principles of notice, choice, 
access, security, and enforcement are described below. 
1.  Notice  
This principle entails notice to the consumer regarding collection, use and disclosure to 
third parties of personal information obtained from the consumer. Personal information is 
defined as data that is used to identify, contact, or locate a person, including name, address, 
telephone number, or e -mail address. Providing notice online generally entails posting a 
privacy policy on a Web site that states what personal information is collected, how the Web 
site uses that information internally, whether or not it shares the information with any affiliates 
or third parties, and whether or not it offers consumers an opportunity to limit any or all of the 
information sharing listed. 
2.  Consumer Choice  
The second Fair Information Principle states that consumers should have the choice to 
prevent the use or disclosure of personal information to third parties (the information being 
required to complete the original transaction and thus not involving any choice).  
Consumer choice includes two basic mechanisms: opt-out and opt-in. In “opt-out,” the 
default is that the individual allows the Web site to share any collected information. With the 
“opt-in” mechanism, the default is for the Web site not to share any personal information it 
                                                 
15 CATE (1997), supra note 4, at 66. See also Fred Cate & Robert Litan, Constitutional Issues in Information 
Privacy (Sep. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Reg. Stud.). 
16 F ED. T RADE C OMMISSION, P RIVACY O NLINE: F AIR I NFORMATION P RACTICES  IN  THE E LECTRONIC 
MARKETPLACE, A R EPORT   TO C ONGRESS (May 2000) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000text.pdf>.  
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collects.
17 In general, the current policy in the U.S. is opt-out.  That is consumers, must opt-out 
of information sharing with unaffiliated third parties; otherwise, such parties can use that 
information. Typically, consumers are not able to limit  how companies use and share their 
information internally among different departments, divisions, and subsidiaries. 
Some privacy advocates would extend choice to the disclosure of personal information 
to affiliated companies and to use in internal marketing as well. That is, companies with 
partnerships with other service providers would have to treat those partners as unrelated third 
parties when it comes to sharing the personal information of customers. If extended to internal 
uses, different departments within the same company would not be able to share consumer data 
without explicit customer authorization. 
In describing choice, there is also an issue of how to define what personal information is 
covered.
18 Do different pieces of information call for different treatment––with consumers 
having to consent to the use of some, but not others? Should companies collecting information 
offer consumers a menu of choices, each with different levels of data sharing? Finally, consider 
how long a choice decision will stand? That is, if I agree to allow a company to trade my 
personal information with a third party, is there any time limit on when that company must stop 
selling my data? Can that company sell my information as many times as it wants? If I opt-out 
of information sharing, for how long should the company be required to honor that choice?  
                                                 
17 For example, suppose the mechanism is opt-out. When Jane Doe visits Amazon.com and clicks on the privacy 
notice, she pulls up a description of the types of information Amazon collects and what it does with that 
information. At the bottom of the screen is a link that allows Ms. Doe to change her choice to prevent Amazon 
from sharing any personal data that she might fill out in the course of ordering a book from the Web site. Unless 
she changes her choice in this manner, the default will allow Amazon to share her information with its affiliates 
in the ways described by its privacy policy. If the mechanism were opt-in the Web site would need to solicit Ms. 
Doe’s agreement to allow for information sharing. Note that a Web site would not need a single rule for all 
information transactions. Instead, some sensitive information (like Social Security numbers) could be governed 
by an opt-in policy while other information (like email addresses) could be covered by an opt-out policy. Note 
that if opt-in or opt-out rules are accompanied by a refusal to do business with consumers who do not supply 
information, then, in practice, choice offers little in the way of privacy protection. In this case, consumers face 
an all or nothing choice: shop and supply information or go to another store.  
18 Opt-in and opt-out policies can vary in several dimensions. One important issue for consumers is a clear 
understanding of what they are agreeing to in each particular instance.  See ARI S CHWARTZ & P AULA J. 
BRUENING, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., ON CONSENT, CHOICE, AND CHECK BOXES: SORTING OUT THE 
OPT-IN V. OPT-OUT DEBATE (Apr. 2001).  
 
7                                                                         
                                                                            
                                                                                                                                        
 
3.  Access  
The third Fair Information Principle states that consumers should have access to the 
personal information that Web sites collect, as well as an opportunity to correct any 
inaccuracies. Some privacy advocates have suggested extending this to require access to the 
name and address of every affiliate or third party using a consumer’s data. Access can further 
be defined in terms of the type of information and the means of access. For example, should 
consumers have access to all information or just critical information, like credit data? How 
should access be provided—for example, online or offline?  
4.  Security  
The fourth Fair Information Principle states that Web sites should take “reasonable 
steps” to protect the security of the personal information collected from customers. For 
example, Web sites should have policies and procedures in place to preclude unauthorized 
disclosure. Just what constitutes “unauthorized” disclosure has become a thornier issue in the 
wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. For example, the Bush Administration has proposed 
broad new authorizations for law enforcement access to business, telephone, email, bank, and 
credit reports, even without judicial review or a requirement for “probable cause.”
19 
Balancing consumer access and security can be difficult. Computer database security is 
largely dependent on technology––ways to allow authorized use while keeping unauthorized 
users out. Internet technologies change swiftly, making it impractical for the government to 
dictate what constitutes a “secure” database. On the other hand, without a defined standard, few 
consumers will be able to evaluate a Web site’s security measures.
20 Perhaps more importantly, 
security is often dependent on the end user more than the Web site host: users must remember 
not disclose passwords or leave computer systems logged-in and unattended.
21 
5.  Enforcement  
The final principle for Fair Information Practices calls for enforcement of applicable 
privacy obligations, including penalties for any infringements. Enforcement can entail several 
different dimensions. For example, if the industry is self-regulated, enforcement can involve 
                                                 
19 Lewis, supra note 6. 
20 FRED CATE, PRIVACY IN PERSPECTIVE 47 (2000).  
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disqualification from industry associations or the removal of “approved privacy seals” by third 
party auditing groups. If regulated by the government, enforcement can include fines imposed 
by oversight groups, like the FTC. It might also include civil suits brought by state Attorneys 
General on behalf of citizens, or private law suits brought by individuals.  
 
II.  The Privacy Debate In Economic Terms: Literature Review 
The topic of privacy has a long history in the law and economics literature.
22 And 
electronic privacy issues have been raised even before computers were widespread. George 
Orwell’s vision of an all-knowing, all-monitoring computer society, Nineteen Eighty-Four, was 
published in 1949.
23  Some present day scholars see Orwell’s eerie vision fulfilled in the 
Internet. Others see the beginnings of a more efficient society, with democratic benefits for 
all.
24 
Many of the basic arguments in the policy literature can be reduced to the  existence and 
alienability of property rights in personal information. At one extreme, some privacy advocates 
assume the existence of personal information property rights. Every detail about me (my 
height, the computer I use, my email address) belongs to me and can be used only with my 
permission. At the other extreme is the idea that whoever collects information may use that data 
because individuals give up any ownership rights once their personal information is reported or 
legally observed.  
In the economics literature, two other fundamental issues arise: first, whether a “market 
failure” exists,
25 and second, whether government intervention is likely to improve things.  
Beliefs about whether and how various markets have failed (such as by resulting in the “over” 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
21 Id. at 47. 
22 For early examples of a theoretical nature, see ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); R OBERT 
ELLIS, P RIVACY: H OW TO P ROTECT  W HAT’S L EFT  OF I T (1979); Eugene Volokh,  Freedom of Speech and 
Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop Others from Speaking About You,  52 
STANFORD L. REV. 1049 (2000). 
23 G EORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).  For a more analytical treatment, see ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS (1971). 
24 For a thought-provoking analysis, see CASS SUSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001). 
25 Francis Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. E CON. 351-379 (1958). Dennis Carlton and Jeffrey 
Perloff define market failure using the classic example of a polluting company: “[a company’s] private marginal 
cost (their out-of-pocket production cost) of making one more unit is less than the social marginal cost (the 
private marginal cost plus the damage from the pollution). As a result, they produce more than is socially 
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provision of personal information), profoundly affects one’s views on the need for government 
intervention. For example, scholars concerned about the overprovision of information argue for 
allocating property rights in personal information to the individual. Some privacy advocates 
believe there are several different types of market failures, while others believe markets are 
working reasonably well with regard to privacy protection. Still others believe that legislation is 
called for in certain instances, like protecting children online, but not in others, like limiting 
unsolicited emails to adults.  
Measuring the likely impact of government online privacy policy is critical in assessing 
the desirability of government intervention. Suppose, for example, that firms are required to 
inform consumers of their privacy policies and they mail out long, legalistic, notices that very 
few people read. Such requirements may result in very few benefits for consumers while 
entailing significant costs.  The point is that the likely costs and benefits of various policies 
aimed at protecting various aspects of privacy need to be thought through very carefully before 
supporting a particular policy.  
For analytical convenience, we group the privacy literature into four different camps. 
These camps are based either on the preferred policy of a particular group or its principle 
concern. The first two camps––the anti-surveillance camp and tradable property rights 
advocates––share the view that a market failure arises because individuals are not given an 
implicit or explicit property right in personal information.  The third camp, which we call the 
free-flow advocates, generally believe that rights to information should be retained by firms or 
individuals that organize information in useful ways, so as to maximize the availability of 
useful information in society.  The final camp, the utilitarians, argues for analyzing privacy 
issues on a case-by-case basis––carefully weighing the economic costs and benefits of 
proposed policies.
26 
The four camps are summarized in Table 1.  The anti-surveillance advocates fear the 
detrimental effects of a highly networked society in which the Internet can be used as a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
optimal. Such distortions, or inefficiencies in production due to improper pricing, are referred to as market 
failures” (DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 82 (2000).) 
26 These camps provide a useful venue for discussing differences in policy perspectives.  This characterization is 
not meant to be mutually exclusive or exhaustive. Moreover, there are many other characterizations that could 
be useful.  One such characterization might relate to beliefs about the constitutionality of different kinds of 
privacy provisions.  On this matter, see Cate & Litan, supra note 15.  
 
10                                                                         
                                                                            
                                                                                                                                        
 
surveillance tool.  They believe in strong governmental protections for individuals, such as 
giving the individual the right to decide when certain kinds of personal information can be used 
by a Web site. The tradable property rights camp suggests another solution to information 
overuse: allocate rights in certain kinds of personal information to individuals and make those 
rights tradable. This camp believes that, because of a poor definition of rights, information is 
not priced properly and thus tends to get overused. The free-flow advocates believe that 
individuals give up rights once they report information, assuming these rights even exist. They 
argue that the right to use personal information should reside with the firms collecting it 
because they value it most highly and because more information for commerce is generally a 
good thing. They are less concerned about matters of surveillance and infringements upon 
people’s sense of their “personal space.” The final camp, the utilitarians, tends to take a 
pragmatic view. In particular instances, they could endorse the policies supported by the other 
camps.  Their distinguishing feature is their interest in applying economic analysis on a case-
by-case basis.  
To better understand the insights offered by each of these four camps, we review key 
publications covering divergent views regarding online privacy and its protection. This is not 
meant to be an exhaustive evaluation of the vast literature on privacy. Instead, our intent is to 
provide a balanced view of the online privacy debate, presenting each argument in its best light 
and offering our critiques.  
A.  The Anti-Surveillance Camp 
We begin our review with the pessimistic side of the literature. Members of the anti-
surveillance camp paint the picture of an Internet that is used to glean information from the 
unsuspecting user, much like Orwell’s Big Brother. To highlight the invasive nature of the 
Internet, Jerry Kang compares shopping for and buying a red silk scarf at a mall with a credit 
card to a similar shopping process online.
27 At the local mall, shoppers may observe you 
walking through the concourse, but they do not file that information away permanently, as can 
occur in online shopping.
28 The clerk at the mall bookstore may note that you browse through a 
few magazines, but he will not write down the titles of those magazines or the length of time 
                                                 
27 Kang, supra note 5.  
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you read each article, as can happen with Internet browsing.
29 Any items you purchase at the 
mall for cash will leave no trace of a personal record, but as of yet online cash-equivalents 
allowing for anonymous purchases on the Web are not widely employed.
30  
The only truly parallel instance of information collection and storage between the mall 
visit and online shopping is the  actual credit card purchase (the red silk scarf in Kang’s 
example).
31 Both online and off, the use of a credit card “generates data that are detailed, 
computer-processable, indexed by name, and potentially permanent.”
32 Online, however, all of 
your actions––every Web site you visit, every item you examine, even briefly––can be 
monitored and recorded. Even more disturbing to some is the notion that all of these disparate 
pieces of information can be combined, creating a detailed personal dossier about you that can 
then be sold to the highest bidder.
33 
This camp of privacy advocates conjectures that constant surveillance and record 
keeping harms people in the most fundamental way: it affronts human dignity.
34 Unlike the 
casual observation that people encounter from passers-by each day, like the fellow shoppers in 
the mall scenario, the constant surveillance engendered by Internet technologies “leads to self-
censorship.”
35 Knowing we are watched, we behave differently.
36 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
28 Kang argues that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and telephone companies “track precisely where, when, and 
how fast” you move through “cyberspace” (id. at 1198). 
29 This is an oversimplification. While offline bookstores may not record every item you browse, they do collect 
information on you and your shopping habits through frequent shopper discount programs, credit card use, and 
the purchase of third-party databases. 
30 Single-use credit cards, used much like a pre-paid phone calling cards, can provide that service for Internet 
shopping. American Express offers such a service, called Private Payments.  See American Express,  Private 
Payments (visited Sep. 4, 2001) < http://www26.americanexpress.com/privatepayments/info_page.jsp>. As of 
yet, however, single-use credit cards have not been widely used.  
31 The stark contrast that Kang draws between the online and offline worlds may be blurring, though. As Lewis 
noted, “It is now virtually impossible to walk the streets of New York City, buy a hamburger, rent a car, enter a 
major building, or drive from Raleigh to Atlanta without being captured on videotape or closed-circuit TV. The 
terrorist attacks will lead to greater use of surveillance cameras in public space” (Lewis, supra note 6).  
32 Kang, supra note 5, at 1198. The permanence of these records is debatable, however. First, dated personal 
information is likely to have little economic value given the frequency with which people move, change jobs, 
and get married or divorced. Second, changing technology often renders old data storage systems incompatible 
with newer systems. The costs involved in either making new systems backward compatible, or in translating 
old data into the new system are often not justifiable. 
33 Litman, supra note 13, at 1285. 
34 Kang, supra note 5, at 1260. 
35 Id. at 1260. See also Oscar H. Gandy Jr., Legitimate Business Interest: No End in Sight? An Inquiry into the 
Status of Privacy in Cyberspace, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 77-79 (1996). 
36 This notion of self-censorship was also endorsed by Orwell in Nineteen Eighty-Four. Lawrence Lessig makes 
the opposite point: Knowing we are not watched, we behave differently. See L ESSIG (1999), supra note 6, at 
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While numerous laws intended to protect privacy are on the books in the U.S.,
37federal 
regulation advocates feel that collectively these laws fail to protect personal information.
38 The 
“general omnibus privacy statutes, such as the federal Privacy Act and its state analogues, fail 
because they apply only to government action.”
39 Sector-specific laws, like the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA) or the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, also fail because 
they do not “substantially constrain a transacting party from collecting” the types of personal 
information that is routinely gathered through commerce.
40  
  What, then, do the advocates who fear a surveillance society want done to protect 
information privacy? Many argue for a government enforced information sharing rule for 
online transactions based on the opt-in standard.
41 In the default, personal information could be 
collected and used only when “functionally necessary”––that is, when required to complete the 
transaction at hand.
42 Furthermore, information that was collected for functionally necessary 
tasks could not be used later for any other reason, unless the individual gives express consent. 
Such a rule would virtually eliminate the secondary market in personal information. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
142-143. That is, some behaviors that are not approved by society, like writing pornography or stalking children, 
are made possible by the cloak of anonymity.  
37 See § III for a discussion. 
38 As mentioned above, Litman argues that in addition to the federal laws, common law falls short as well: “current 
law does not provide a tort remedy for invasion of data privacy…” (Litman, supra note 13, at 1283) because 
“the invasion of privacy tort is too narrowly defined to serve” (1304). That is, “tort law protects personal data 
from disclosure only when it conveys embarrassing personal information” (1291).  
39 Kang, supra note 5, at 1232 (footnotes omitted). 
40 Id. at 1232. Kang argues that the FCRA does not adequately limit what payment providers are allowed to do 
with the data they collect. The Act allows any information sharing that meets a “legitimate business need,” but 
the courts have interpreted this phrase so broadly that “the practice of exchanging credit reports could be 
justified by any number of reasons, including database marketing” (1236-1237). The Consumer Credit 
Reporting Reform Act of 1996, however, closes this loophole. The 1996 Act updates the FCRA by narrowing 
the definition of “legitimate business need” to a  “business transaction that is initiated by the consumer” or 
needed “to review an account to determine whether the consumer continues to meet the terms of the account” 
(Fair Credit Reporting (FCRA) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1999) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcra.htm>). See also CATE (1997), supra note 4, at 82-83. We review the FCRA 
and its amendment in more detail in § III. 
41 Litman is doubtful that such federal legislation will ever be passed: “…meaningful privacy regulation appears to 
be unenactable as a political matter…” (Litman, supra note 13, at 1287). Instead, she argues that, while “current 
law does not provide a tort remedy for invasion of data privacy, …there are a number of different strands in tort 
jurisprudence that might be extended to encompass one” (1283). She concludes, however, that the tort remedy is 
the best among poor alternatives and “…the resulting protection scheme is unlikely to satisfy those of us who 
believe that data privacy is worth protecting” (1283).   
42 Note, however, that this rule need not apply to all Internet information collection points. Individuals exchanging 
data online in “public” forum, like chat rooms or on bulletin boards, do not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy and post their information knowing that “untold numbers of people” will have access to it (Kang, supra 
note 5, at 1283).    
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Kang presents a framework for his argument in support of the opt-in proposal.
43 Let the 
status quo default of opt-out be designated by Do. Designate an opt-in default by Di. In either 
regime, some participants will find the default rule inefficient. Those individuals (or firms) 
unhappy with the default face two choices: contract around the default rule (“flip” the rule) or 
accept the rule and its inefficiencies (“stick” with the rule, perhaps due to transaction costs 
associated with flipping). The cost of a rule is the total cost for all affected individuals, which 
can be broken down into the total cost of flipping plus the total cost of sticking. Define this 
total social cost as  
) ( ) ( d d d d d s c s f c f Cost + = . 
where d denotes the default regime (either o or i); fd denotes the number of transactions where 
the parties negotiate a new information sharing rule (a “flip”); c(fd) is the cost of negotiating a 
flip; sd denotes the number of transactions where the parties unwillingly “stick ” with the given 
rule; and c(sd) is the cost of the inefficiencies associated with sticking.
44 The first term on the 
right hand side of the equation–– ( ) d d f c f ––is the total cost of flipping, and the second term on 
the right hand side–– ( ) d d s c s ––is the total cost of sticking.  
Which regime imposes a higher social cost? Kang argues that the opt-out regime is 
more costly to society than the opt-in regime for two reasons. First, finding out which entities 
share personal information and with whom is a costly task for consumers.
45 Second, individuals 
wanting to flip may not have the bargaining power to do so without working together––that is, 
without organizing other individuals for group negotiations with the companies collecting 
information.
46 These factors point to a regime where few people ever flip. Instead, a large 
number of participants face inefficiencies, but stick nonetheless. Therefore, the social cost of an 
opt-out rule is dominated by sticking costs and can be approximated by  ) ( o o s c s . 
                                                 
43 Id. at 1249-1259. He bases his discussion of contracting costs on Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in 
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). We have altered Kang’s 
notation here in order to simplify the discussion. 
44 Kang’s framework is based on two distinct information sharing rules. We can extend the model to cover a 
continuum of choices by imagining that each piece of information is governed by a separate rule. That is, email 
addresses could be covered by opt-out while physical addresses are covered by opt-in, and so forth. 
45 This seems less applicable today than in 1998 when Kang’s article was published because of the dramatic rise in 
the number of Web sites posting privacy notices. See the discussion in § IV. 
46 See, for example, MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971).  
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Under an opt-in default rule, however, Kang argues that the number of participants 
forced to stick with an inefficient rule are minimal. The information collector does not “bear 
any research costs since it already knows what its information practices are,” nor does it need 
to use collective action to reach any negotiated change.
47 Thus the opt-in regime “will generate 
an equilibrium in which the firms who value personal information more than the individual––
and thus for whom a plenary use [opt-out] rule would be more efficient––would likely flip out 
of the default rule of functionally necessary use.”
48 In other words, the social cost under an opt-
in is dominated by flipping costs and can be approximated by  ) ( i i f c f . 
The comparison between the two regimes thus comes down to a comparison of the 
sticking costs associated with opt-out (since flipping will be rare) and the flipping costs 
associated with opt-in (since sticking will be rare). Kang argues that opt-out is more costly to 
society because  ) ( ) ( i i o o f c f s c s > . He believes the number of individuals forced to stick––so–– 
and the cost associated with sticking under opt-out––c(so)––both are quite high, while the 
flipping cost associated with opt-in––c(fi)––“may well be trivial because cyberspace makes 
communications cheap.”
49 On these grounds, he argues for a federally mandated opt-in default 
rule to govern the commercial collection of all personal information on the Internet. Kang does 
not offer any estimates of the costs involved. 
Evaluation 
The anti-surveillance camp, and Kang in particular, do not provide estimates of  the 
costs associated with flipping. We think Kang may be underestimating the transaction costs 
involved with flipping given information sharing rule. Because of simple inertia, many, perhaps 
most, people would simply let the default stand rather than make an explicit choice. That is, 
sticking would prevail under either default. As a result, with an opt-out mechanism many 
people would allow Web sites to share their information. With an opt-in mechanism Web sites 
would find it difficult to negotiate a consensus with consumers on sharing arrangements.  
                                                 
47 Kang, supra note 5, at 1257.  
48 Id. at 1257.  
49 Id. at 1258. Note that the cost of uncovering information sharing practices that consumers perceive as violating 
privacy is also cheaper on the Internet, which may undermine Kang’s argument that flipping will be rare under 
opt-out.   
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As an actual example, consider a study of the financial services industry conducted by 
Ernst & Young.
50 One survey question asked financial institutions to estimate the response rate 
under opt-out and opt-in regimes. “While there was considerable variation in the responses, the 
majority of respondents indicated that the response rate under either system would be 10 
percent or less.” That is, under opt-in, 10 percent of Web site visitors would share their 
information; and under opt-out 90 percent would share their information. The two different 
information defaults would thus have dramatically different effects on commerce and privacy.
51 
The decision for opt-in or opt-out need not be an all or nothing choice, of course. 
Certain kinds of highly sensitive information (say, health diagnoses like HIV positive status) 
may deserve the extra protection that opt-in affords. Other types of information may be more 
valuable to society when shared (like credit history information, discussed below). Thus, a 
menu of choices for consumers could provide both meaningful information protection and 
efficient information sharing.  
B.  The Tradable Rights Camp 
Also favoring an overall opt-in default rule, the tradable rights camp proposes a 
mechanism by which participants can negotiate a “flip”––a market for personal information.
52 
While this group also sees information privacy as a personal right, it believes that individuals 
should be allowed to act in their own best interests by deciding when  to sell, trade, or give 
                                                 
50 CYNTHIA G LASSMAN, E RNST & Y OUNG LLP, C USTOMER BENEFITS FROM CURRENT INFORMATION SHARING  
BY F INANCIAL S ERVICES C OMPANIES (December 2000) (visited September 4, 2001) 
<http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/glassman.pdf>. 
51 We examine this issue again when we discuss the costs and benefits of proposed online privacy legislation in § 
IV. 
52 See, for example, Kenneth C. Laudon, Extensions to the Theory of Markets and Privacy: Mechanics of Pricing 
Information, in P RIVACY  AND S ELF R EGULATION  IN THE I NFORMATION AGE (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce & 
National Telecommunications & Information Administration (NTIA), June 1997) (visited September 4, 2001) 
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfreg1.htm >; Hal R. Varian, Economic Aspects of Personal Privacy, 
in PRIVACY AND SELF REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE (U.S. Dep’t of Com. & Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. 
Admin. (NTIA), Jun. 1997) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfreg1.htm>; and, 
Eli M. Noam, Privacy and Self-Regulation: Markets for Electronic Privacy, in PRIVACY AND SELF REGULATION 
IN THE INFORMATION AGE (U.S. Dep’t of Com. & Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. Admin. (NTIA), Jun. 1997) (visited 
Sep. 4, 2001) < http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfreg1.htm >. For a survey article summarizing the 
tradable rights camp, among others, see Karl Belgum,  Who Leads at Half-time? Three Conflicting Visions of 
Internet Privacy Policy, 6 R ICHMOND J. L. & T ECH. 1 (1999) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v6i1/belgum.html>.  
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away their information.
53 They argue that a national information market currently exists among 
corporations, but individuals have no bargaining power in it. If consumers had personal 
information ownership rights, they could better control how much information is made 
available on their email addresses, their computer, and their Web site visits.  
Many privacy advocates believe that the current opt-out regime has devalued personal 
information and thus encouraged its overuse.
54 In economic terms, the companies collecting 
personal information impose a negative externality on consumers. Because these companies 
benefit from the information they collect, but do not face the costs they impose (i.e., the 
violation of consumers’ privacy), they collect “too much” information. Tradable rights 
proponents believe the problem can be solved by some combination of an opt-in sharing default 
(that is, the federal government would grant individuals a “property right” in their information) 
along with individual participation in the market for personal information. 
 This camp argues that an information market outcome with a re-assignment of rights 
would be efficient, overcoming the information overuse problem: those individuals valuing 
privacy the most would set a relatively high price for their information; corporations would pay 
the market value for information and collect only that data which justified the cost.
55 In other 
words, companies would be forced to “internalize” the costs of the data they gather. 
The personal information market could function in several different ways. One 
possibility is that for each bit of personal information an individual reveals online, she is 
compensated in some fashion, either through money or a credit/discount for additional online 
goods and services. Along these lines, Eli Noam envisions “personal access charge accounts” 
handled by separate billing service providers.
56 The Internet is uniquely situated to allow for 
this kind of quid pro quo because it is an effective medium for low cost negotiation.
57 Another 
                                                 
53 In contrast, some members of the anti-surveillance camp argue that allowing individuals to participate in an 
information market would exacerbate the privacy problem by encouraging trade in personal information rather 
than constraining it. See Litman, supra note 13, at 1283. 
54 See, for example, id. at 41; and, PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS, WORLD DATA 
FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE (1998). 
55 Noam, supra note 52, at “Markets In Privacy.” 
56 Id. at “Examples for the Market Approach, Telemarketing.” 
57 Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, Draft 2, Paper Presented at the Taiwan Net ’98 Conference (Mar. 
1998) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/works/lessig/architecture_priv.pdf>.  
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possibility, proposed by Kenneth Laudon, is the creation of information brokers.
58 These 
“infomediaries” would bundle information together for resale to commercial buyers, say in 
demographically similar groups of 1,000. Individuals would then receive royalties on the 
sales.
59  
 Evaluation  
There are several practical limitations to the tradable rights theory. These include 
enforcement of property rights, constitutional issues, and valuation issues. Extending the 
information market to individual participation would likely require the creation of a “legal and 
enforcement system with an unacceptably high level of expense and complexity.”
60 How do I 
know, for example, where a firm obtained my email address? Was it from me or some other 
available source that was legal? Vast amounts of personal data are already in the public 
domain. Consider, for example, telephone directories, employee personnel databases, credit 
reports, and other public or semi-public sources. 
Once an individual has sold her personal information, she loses much control over it.
61 
Even assuming that sales contracts prohibited any information reuse, enforcing a clause of this 
type would be difficult. Because of the immense amounts of data about any given individual 
already in the public domain, how would that individual verify when a contract was broken? 
Equally important to the cost and complexity of such a system is its constitutionality. 
As Litman argues, the U.S. has “a long-standing commitment to freedom of expression.” 
Eugene Volokh makes this point as well. He notes that the arguments put forth to defend 
information privacy rights “don’t fit well into the intellectual property exceptions to the First 
                                                 
58 Laudon,  supra note 52, at “The Legal and Economic Foundations for Individual Ownership of  Personal 
Information.” 
59 At least one such company has already surfaced. Lumeria, a company based in Berkeley, California, blocks the 
transmission of its subscribers’ personal information to the Web sites they visit. The company then sells its 
subscribers’ data in an anonymous and aggregated form to marketers, paying royalties to its clients. The Coming 
Backlash in Privacy, ECONOMIST TECH. Q., Dec. 9, 2000, at 4. 
60 Henry Perritt, Regulatory Models for Protecting Privacy in the Internet, in PRIVACY AND SELF REGULATION IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE (U.S. Dep’t of Com. & Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. Admin. (NTIA), Jun. 1997) (visited 
Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfreg1.htm>. 
61 Noam, supra note 52, at “Data Banks.”  
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Amendment, which generally don’t entitle anyone to restrict the communication of facts.”
62 
Thus, an information market is likely to run-afoul of the First Amendment.
63  
Finally, consumers may initially find it difficult to determine a reasonable price for their 
information. Commercial buyers will have a much better notion of the value of a particular 
piece of personal information––individuals may not get “market value” in this case.
64 A related 
problem is that an individual’s information may not have genuine commercial value per se; that 
is, information may be valuable only if it is combined with other information for that individual 
or is available for some threshold number of individuals.
65 As a result, under some 
circumstances Web sites could have a bargaining advantage over individuals.
66 We think, 
however, issues related to price discovery and value could be addressed effectively in most 
cases by third parties if a market does develop.
67  
C.  The Free-Flow of Information Camp 
While the anti-surveillance camp and the tradable rights camp support giving more 
rights implicitly or explicitly to individuals, the free-flow of information camp argues that 
allocating rights in this manner is inefficient.
68 They do not see the problem as one of overuse; 
                                                 
62 Volokh, supra note 22. 
63 Litman, supra note 13, at 1294; and, id. at 1049. 
64 This may be the result of “asymmetric information”––that is, “situations where one economic agent knows 
something that another economic agent doesn’t. For example, a worker might have a better idea of how much he 
could produce than his employer does, or a producer might have a better idea of the quality of a good he 
produces than a potential consumer has” (HAL R. V ARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 440 (W.W. Norton & 
Company 1978) (1992).) In the case of online information, asymmetries arise because collectors of information 
know what they intend to do with the data, what other pieces of information they will add to it, who they will 
share it with or sell it to, and how it will ultimately be used.  
65 Peter P. Swire,  Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the Protection of Personal 
Information, in P RIVACY  AND S ELF R EGULATION IN THE I NFORMATION AGE (U.S. Dep’t of Com. & Nat’l 
Telecomm. & Info. Admin. (NTIA), Jun. 1997) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfreg1.htm >. 
66 Web sites collecting aggregated personal information may lose less by refusing to bargain with one individual, 
but that individual could stand to lose quite a bit by foregoing an online transaction with that Web site. As close 
substitutes for that site emerge, the advantage may lessen. For example, there may be situations in which 
information intermediaries need information on entire blocks of consumers to enhance the value of the database.  
In some cases, individual consumers could have an advantage. 
67 Litman argues that granting individuals bargaining rights in the market for personal information would increase 
the use of such data and thus decrease individuals’ privacy even more. See Litman, supra note 13, at 1297-1301. 
68 Cate and Staten argue that opt-in “is always more expensive than an ‘opt-out’ system. Opt-in requires that every 
consumer be contacted to gain explicit permission.  Under opt-out, contact only occurs for those consumers who 
wish to withhold permission” (FRED CATE & MICHAEL STATEN, DIRECT MARKETING ASS’N, INC., PROTECTING 
PRIVACY IN THE NEW MILLENIUM: THE FALLACY OF “OPT-IN” (2001) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.the-
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instead, they think consumers will benefit as more information is shared—and that greater 
sharing will not be promoted if rights are given to individuals.
69  
Paul Rubin and Tom Lenard argue that consumers actually benefit from receiving 
timely information that is precisely tailored to their needs.
70 For example, if Jane Doe wants to 
purchase a printer, she benefits from an informative email from a hardware retailer with details 
on the models carried, their features, and their prices. What is annoying is receiving an email 
on a printer sale when Ms. Doe is in fact shopping for a scanner. A company, Rubin and 
Lenard claim, has no incentive to send a solicitation to consumers who are likely to discard it. 
That would be a waste of money, and could create a negative customer reaction. The solution to 
this problem, they argue, is more information, not less.
71 
The free-flow of information group also argues consumers benefit indirectly from 
sharing personal information. The Internet currently offers a great deal of “free” content. 
Internet companies like Yahoo! finance the provision of their free services largely through 
advertising revenues.
72 According to a recent study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, online 
advertising revenues totaled $4.6 billion in 1999 and rose to $8.2 billion in 2000.
73 Advertisers 
paid Web sites in exchange for a being able to target valued consumers. As Rubin and Lenard 
note, “Without the personalized data that Yahoo! obtains from its subscribers and elsewhere, 
this business model would not work and the personalized services that Yahoo! and similar sites 
provide to consumers would not be available.”
74 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
dma.org/isec/optin.shtml>).  See also Keith Sharfman,  Regulating Cyberactivity Disclosers: A Contractarian 
Approach, 17 U. CHI.LEGAL F. 30, 639 (1996). 
69 Because consumers benefit from information sharing indirectly, as individuals they may not choose the socially 
optimal level of sharing. For example, the discussion below details the benefits to all consumers of having a 
well-developed consumer credit information collection system. Individuals with poor credit histories, however, 
would like to hide their records. Given a choice, they would opt-out of sharing, and in the process would harm 
all credit recipients. 
70  PAUL H. RUBIN & THOMAS LENARD, PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND, PRIVACY AND THE COMMERCIAL USE OF 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 9-10 (Jul. 2001) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.pff.org/pr/pr073001privacy.htm >.  
71 For example, Hal Varian argues that, “It is important to recognize that this form of annoyance [junk mail]––
essentially excess search costs––arises because the seller has too little information about the buyer. If the seller 
knew precisely whether or not I was interested in buying insurance or refinancing my mortgage, he could make 
a much better decision about whether or not to provide me with information about his product” (Varian (1997), 
supra note 52). 
72 Advertising accounted for 80-90 percent of Yahoo!’s revenue in 2000.  See Yahoo!Investor, MultexInvestor 
(visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://yahoo.marketguide.com/mgi/MG.asp?nss=yahoo&rt=qbussegm&rn=A0DCA>. 
73 PriceWaterhouseCoopers & Interactive Advertising Bureau,  IAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report (Apr. 
2001).  
74 RUBIN & LENARD, supra note 70, at 43.  
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A more indirect, but nonetheless important channel for consumer benefit is through 
information resale. That is, once a Web site has collected personal information from an 
individual to complete, say, a credit card purchase of a red silk scarf, it can be shared with 
affiliates or sold to third parties. Rather than representing a “loss of privacy control,” Rubin and 
Lenard believe the multiple-use feature of personal information is a “public good,” improving 
the productivity of the economy.
75 Cate concurs: “The benefits from the open flow of 
information (at risk when the protection of privacy interferes) are so integral a part of daily life 
that people seldom explicitly recognize or fully understand them.”
76 Advertisers, credit 
institutions, and insurance companies all cooperate in collecting and using information, thus 
reducing the cost to each participant. These savings are passed on to all consumers.  
One of the best-documented benefits of information sharing is credit reporting. The 
information sharing rules defined by the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA)
77 have 
allowed the creation of pooled consumer loans that can be sold to investors––a process known 
as securitization. Pooling loans saves American consumers as much as “$80 billion a year on 
mortgage loans because of the liquidity that credit bureau information makes possible.”
78 
Credit reporting has also led to almost instant credit approval: “In 1997, 82 percent of 
automobile loan applicants received a decision within an hour; 48 percent of applicants 
received a decision within 30 minutes.”
79  
Free flow of information advocates argue that allowing companies to share information 
across affiliations also has fraud detection and prevention benefits. Businesses need to closely 
monitor account activity in order to identify unusual behavior, a typical indicator of 
unauthorized credit card use. The FBI also accesses credit report data and other commercial 
sources of consumer information to assist in crime prevention. Former FBI Director Louis 
Freeh noted that for just one year, “Information from these inquiries assisted in the arrests of 
393 fugitives wanted by the FBI, the identification of more than $37 million in seizable assets, 
                                                 
75 Id. at 8. 
76 CATE (2000), supra note 20, at 2. 
77 FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, supra note 40. 
78 FRED CATE & MICHAEL STATEN, ONLINE PRIVACY ALLIANCE, PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST: CONSUMER BENEFITS 
OF I NFORMATION S HARING  (1999), emphasis in original, (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/consumerbenies.pdf>. 
79 Id. (citing a 1998 Automobile Finance Study conducted by Consumer Bankers Association, Arlington, VA).  
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the locating of 1,966 individuals wanted by law enforcement, and the locating of 3,209 
witnesses wanted for questioning.”
80 
Selling consumer databases can promote competition too. Jim Harper and Solveig 
Singleton note that new companies can “get a foot in the door because of transfer of 
information from established companies.”
81 Federal law has recognized this benefit to 
consumers. For example, when “opening up monopoly phone markets, the Federal 
Communications Commission, …makes sure that new competitors can access vital consumer 
information.”
82 
Rubin and Lenard argue that no privacy infringement results from online advertising 
and marketing. First, “Advertisers are not interested in the identity of individual consumers.”
83 
They are interested in a block of, say, 1,000 people who are good candidates for buying a new 
car.
84 The “personal” information that is collected simply provides a means to contact those 
1,000 people. Second, personal information is held in computers (usually on large servers), not 
by other individuals. “It is not ‘known’ in any useful sense by a human.”
85 T he sinister 
descriptions of our every move being watched on the Internet are thus greatly misleading. 
Rubin and Lenard conclude that consumer fears regarding loss of privacy are based, at least in 
part, on a lack of understanding about how personal data are collected and used for advertising 
purposes.
86 
Viewed in this light, information sharing advocates believe no market failure exists 
because privacy is not really violated, consumers benefit from information sharing, and 
commerce is more efficient. Rubin and Lenard find support for this position in the lack of 
evidence of consumer harm: 
Given the widespread concerns about privacy and perceptions that personal 
information may be subject to misuse, it is noteworthy that there does not even 
                                                 
80 Id. (citing Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Requests for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary of the 
Committee on Appropriations, Senate, 106
th Congress, 1
st Session (Mar. 24, 1999).) 
81 HARPER & SINGLETON, supra note 8, at 12. 
82 Id. at 12. 
83 RUBIN & LENARD, supra note 70, at 8. 
84 Id at 8. Note also that some types of information are only valuable if many people participate, for example 
telephone numbers for phone books. 
85 Id. at 44. 
86 Id. at 45.  
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appear to be much in the way of anecdotal evidence of harm to consumers from 
the legal use of information for marketing and advertising.
87  
For example, the FTC provided no evidence of consumer harm in either its 1998 or 2000 
report. In a review of privacy issues for the year 2000, CNET, an Internet news company, 
noted, “Despite the fears and concerns, there were no publicized horror stories that resulted 
from a privacy invasion.”
88 Furthermore, no individuals have testified about personal harm in 
Congressional hearings on privacy.
89  
The asymmetric information argument for market failure (discussed above) is also 
rejected by the information flow camp. This kind of market failure exists when consumers are 
unable to determine what Web sites do with their information: what they collect, who they 
share with, how the information is used. While Rubin and Lenard admit that such a failure may 
exist, they believe that market responses are already solving the problem: firms who violate 
privacy expectations can anticipate losing business.
90 There are a number of recent examples of 
the press uncovering corporate information sharing plans that generated public outrage. In the 
face of consumer disapproval, the companies either cancelled their plans before they took effect 
or stopped them shortly after they started. For example:  
•  In 1991, Lotus Development Corporation and Equifax abandoned plans to sell 
households a CD-ROM database containing names, addresses, and marketing 
information on 120 million consumers, after they received “30,000 calls and 
letters from individuals asking to be removed from the database.”
91 
•  In 1997, AOL cancelled plans to sell the telephone numbers of its subscribers to 
telemarketers after the company received angry telephone calls and emails from 
subscribers.
92 
•  In 1998, after only four days in effect, CVS pharmacy changed its program of 
sharing confidential prescription information with a company that sends 
                                                 
87 Id. at  9. 
88 Patricia Jacobus, Privacy Heats Up But Doesn’t Boil Over, CNET NEWS, Dec. 22, 2000 (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-4238135.html?tag=st.cn.sr.ne.1>. 
89 RUBIN & LENARD, supra note 70, at 61. 
90 Id. at 55. 
91 CATE (1997), supra note 4, at 104. 
92 Litman, supra note 13, at 1305 (citing Rajiv Chandrasekaran, AOL Cancels Plan for Telemarketing, WASH. 
POST, Jul. 25, 1997, at G1).  
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reminder notices to patients who failed to refill their prescriptions. “Consumers 
were outraged; the story was a public relations disaster.”
93 
•  In 1999, RealNetworks (a company that makes audio and video streaming 
software) altered its software code after the public learned that the software 
“surreptitiously collected information about the user’s downloading, recording, 
and listening behavior, and transmitted that information to RealNetworks every 
time the user connected to the Internet.”
94 Facing consumer concern, the 
company apologized profusely, updated its privacy policy, and then issued a free 
software patch to eliminate the data transmission.
95 
•  Yahoo! dropped the reverse telephone number search from its site in response to 
consumer anger.
96 
•  In a well-publicized example of consumer power, DoubleClick was forced to 
cancel its plan to link online personally identifiable information with an offline 
database it obtained through the acquisition of Abacus Direct.
97  
•  More recently, N2H2, a company that makes filtering software, stopped selling 
information about Web sites visited by students. Consumers felt that selling this 
information was improper, even though the data did not contain personally 
identifiable information and the records were used anonymously.
98 
Information flow advocates claim that these examples highlight the effectiveness of 
consumer complaints. The nature of the investigative U.S. press means that consumers learn 
quickly about unsavory business information sharing practices. The Internet provides a fast, 
low cost method for unhappy consumers to protest. This combination thus provides a market-
based privacy protection  mechanism. As Rubin and Lenard assert, “the principal asset that 
                                                 
93 Id. (citing Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Prescription Sales, Privacy Fears: CVS, Giant Share Customer Records with 
Drug Marketing Firm, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1998, at A1). 
94 Id. at 1306 (citing Sara Robinson, CD Software Said to Gather Data on Users, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1999, at 
C1). 
95 RealNetworks, Inc. press release, RealNetworks Issues Patch to Address Privacy Concerns of Users (Nov. 1, 
1999) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.realnetworks.com/company/pressroom/pr/99/updateadvisory.html>. 
96 RUBIN & L ENARD, supra note 70, at 66 (citing Daniel Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and 
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STANFORD L. REV 1391, 1418 (2001).) 
97 Id. at 67 (citing Diane Anderson & Keith Perine, Marketing the Double Click Way, THE STANDARD, Mar. 13, 
2000). 
98 Id. at 66 (citing Internet Co. Drops Data Selling Plan, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 22, 2001).  
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online marketers have is their reputation with consumers, and any use of information in a way 
that reduces the value of those reputations is counterproductive for the firm.”
99 
Other self-regulation mechanisms can reinforce the reputation of Web sites. Programs 
like TRUSTe, BBBOnLine Privacy Seal, SAFEcertified.com, and enonymous.com rate the 
privacy policies of Web sites, providing sites that post clear privacy protection policies with a 
seal of approval.
100 These third-party ratings provide easy to identify, useful information to 
consumers; monitoring by well known third parties provides further assurance. Moreover, some 
prominent companies, such as American Express, Compaq, Disney, IBM, Microsoft, and 
Proctor & Gamble refuse to advertise on Web sites that do not have a posted privacy policy.
101 
In order to coordinate privacy efforts such as these, and to keep abreast of consumer opinion, 
many companies are hiring “chief privacy officers” (CPOs).
102  
Finally, the free-flow-of-information camp argues that new federal legislation is not 
required for legal recourse. Once a privacy claim is made by a Web page, it is enforceable by 
the FTC.
103 As Cate notes, “In the online environment the FTC has brought and settled many 
cases in which it alleged that a Web site operator’s failure to adhere to its privacy policy was an 
‘unfair or deceptive’ trade practice in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act.”
104, 
105 
According to the information flow advocates, “the potential benefits of new privacy 
legislation are very small.”
106 They cite the lack of any serious market failures, effective self-
regulation mechanisms, and existing legal recourse for genuine privacy violations as 
justifications for this position. Even if  regulations were tailored perfectly to the needs of 
today’s environment, “they would quickly become obsolete as the Internet changed.”
107 The 
                                                 
99 Id. at 67. Keep in mind that there are negative externalities associated with junk mail. One company with poor 
practices can result in all companies’ unsolicited mailings going unheeded by consumers (57). 
100  See TRUSTe (visited Sep. 4, 2001) < http://www.etrust.com/>; SAFEcertified.com (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.safecertified.com >; enonymous.com (visited Sep. 4, 2001) < http://www.enonymous.com/>; and, 
Better Business Bureau OnLine (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.bbbonline.org>.  
101 RUBIN & LENARD, supra note 70, at 68.   
102 Id. They report that U.S. companies currently retain around 100 CPOs, with that number expected to increase to 
500 by 2002.  
103 As we detail below in § IV, voluntary privacy notices have been posted by increasingly more Web sites over 
time.  
104 CATE (2000), supra note 20, at 28. 
105 To provide just one example, the DoubleClick public relations disaster discussed above involved numerous 
lawsuits. See Jacobus, supra note 88. 
106 RUBIN & LENARD, supra note 70, at 84. 
107 Id.  
 
25                                                                         
                                                                            
                                                                                                                                        
 
laws would have no hope of keeping pace with society’s changing needs. In addition to not 
providing adequate protection, federal legislation could do harm. Because the government is so 
slow to change, while Internet technology moves with amazing speed, government regulation 
could inhibit technological innovations.
108 Indeed, federal legislation could create a market 
failure where none exists now. Thus, the free-flow-of-information camp supports continued 
development of self-regulation with no interference from the federal government.
109 
 Evaluation  
The arguments by the free flow of information camp clearly have merit, but we think 
they go too far. There is an emotional and sometimes also a tangible cost to receiving junk mail 
and junk email for most people, and that cost may be very high for some individuals.  Even if 
Jane Doe is in the market to purchase a computer printer, does she really want to hear from 
hardware company X? Perhaps she would rather research her upcoming purchase using other 
resources, like a consumer report magazine. Some people may want to have the option to turn 
information flows off, even if they would benefit materially from having them there.
110 
It is also unclear whether a company’s incentives are always consistent with consumers’ 
privacy interests.
111 For example, as discussed above, CVS pharmacy had already begun to sell 
its database of prescription users before the press exposed the company’s marketing plan.
112 
We are not saying that CVS should have been prohibited from selling that information, but it is 
interesting to note that it changed its policies after consumers learned of its marketing plans. 
                                                 
108 Id. at 86. SWIRE & LITAN offer an example of this effect. They posit that the “complex regulatory schemes” of 
the EU Privacy Directive “are probably standing in the way of the development of digital signatures,” an 
Internet authentication technology that shows promise a s an online information security measure (SWIRE & 
LITAN, supra note 54, at 206). 
109 While not clearly falling into this camp, L ITAN & NISKANEN do argue for little to no government regulation. 
See ROBERT L ITAN & WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, G OING DIGITAL!: A G UIDE TO POLICY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
(1998). 
110 There are people who place a high value on not being bothered. Even when some intrusions could enhance their 
material well-being or their conventional “utility,” the fact that many intrusion are valueless leads people to 
reject all intrusions. We think more and more people are likely to place a value on not being intruded upon as 
society gets wealthier. Witness, for example, the increased use of caller ID and phone answering machines as a 
way of screening out unwanted solicitations. 
111 As noted previously, companies would also hurt other companies if they choose to send lots of junk mail. This 
could affect consumers’ attitudes toward opening such mail or email. Economists refer to this as a negative 
externality because the firm sending the junk mail imposes costs on other companies but ignores these costs in 
its own marketing decisions.  
112 Litman, supra note 13, at 1305 (citing Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Prescription Sales, Privacy Fears: CVS, Giant 
Share Customer Records with Drug Marketing Firm, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1998, at A1).  
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Smaller companies not likely to be covered by the press radar screen may have even more 
leeway in this regard. 
The claim that advertisers are not really interested in individuals, but in groups of 
demographically similar people, is also misleading. While they may settle for aggregated data 
now, marketers would really like more specific information to truly target their campaigns, as 
Rubin and Leonard argue. The free-flow-of-information advocates believe this would lead to 
less “junk” mail as consumers receive more unsolicited mail that genuinely met their needs. 
However, the logical conclusion of this argument is that individual-specific information would 
be most valuable for individual-specific ads. 
The free-flow-of-information advocates have shown that the current system serves the 
interests of consumers in many cases. They have not shown that the system cannot be improved 
upon with some form of government intervention. 
D.  The Utilitarians 
In a sense, the previous three camps could be considered utilitarians because they 
attempt to provide some economic rationale for their preferred policy. Here, we define 
utilitarians somewhat differently.  Utilitarians are basically pragmatists who would assess the 
merits of online privacy protections on a case-by-case basis using actual data where available.  
This camp is very similar to “privacy pragmatists,”
113 except they have a greater interest in 
using formal economic analysis to weigh the costs and benefits of different policies. The 
utilitarians admit that there may, in fact, be a market failure in the sense that “too much” 
personal information is disclosed and disseminated in some sensitive areas.
114 In this regard, 
they agree with the anti-surveillance camp and the tradable rights camp. But, this agreement 
does not lead to the same conclusion. Rather than a blanket opt-in rule, with its potential for 
inefficiencies and innovation-stifling effects, utilitarians generally see the government as an 
                                                 
113 Westin defines privacy pragmatists as a group weighing the value, both to themselves and to society as a whole, 
of various business or government programs set forth as privacy enhancing. “The pragmatists favor voluntary 
standards over legislation and government enforcement but they will back legislation when they think not 
enough is being done––or meaningfully done––by voluntary means” (Alan Westin,  “Whatever Works” The 
American Public’s Attitudes Toward Regulation and Self-Regulation on Consumer Privacy Issues, in PRIVACY 
AND SELF REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE (U.S. Dep’t of Com. & Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. Admin. 
(NTIA), Jun. 1997) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfreg1.htm >). 
114 SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 54, at 8.  
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uncertain tool for privacy protection, to be used only as a last resort.
115 As Peter Swire and 
Robert Litan lament, with government regulation “Sometimes the cure is worse than the 
disease.”
116  
The key therefore lies in achieving a balance: encouraging non-governmental 
mechanisms to protect privacy and provide industry enforcement, while u sing the federal 
government in limited ways to protect especially sensitive data and to define the ground 
rules.
117 To date, a pragmatic approach has dominated privacy protection legislation in the 
U.S.: selected laws have been enacted that protect certain limited types of personal information 
as specific privacy invasion problems arose.
118 While pragmatic, the approach has not 
necessarily been utilitarian because of the absence of economic analysis. 
This economic approach requires weighing both the costs and b enefits of privacy 
protection: the costs of enacting legislation against the benefits of potentially better privacy 
protection; the costs of occasional privacy blunders (like DoubleClick’s data profiling) with the 
benefits of efficient information flow.  
To illustrate how the utilitarian approach is applied, we reconsider Kang’s cost-benefit 
framework, where the cost of a regime (say opt-in or opt-out) is the sum of flipping costs and 
switching costs. Assume the government chooses an opt-in regulatory regime. Many of the 
potential costs associated with this regime have already been discussed. The inflexibility of 
government legislation to keep pace with technology would indicate sizable sticking costs for 
opt-in. Other factors suggest high sticking costs as well, such as administrative costs associated 
                                                 
115 Westin notes that reluctance to rely on federal regulation has a long history in America, dating back to our 
Founding Fathers. In general, Americans have a preference for market-based solutions over government-based 
ones; have a basic distrust of government; and emphasize individual rights and choices. See Westin (1997), 
supra note 113, at “Voluntary Standards, Government Regulation, and Individual Choices.” 
116 SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 54, at 8-9.  
117 In addition to making a case for self-regulation (see Swire, supra note 65), SWIRE & L ITAN also support the 
creation of a federal office devoted to monitoring privacy concerns (The Office of Electronic Commerce and 
Privacy Policy proposed in S WIRE & L ITAN, supra note 54, at 17). In fact, the Bush Administration recently 
created such an office: U.S. Associate Deputy Attorney General Dan Collins was named “Privacy Czar” (E. 
Scott Wright,  Privacy: The Ugly Truth,” Z IFF-DAVIS N EWS, Aug. 7, 2001 (visited Sep. 5, 2001) 
<http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/zd/20010807/tc/privacy_the_ugly_truth_1.html>).   
118 U.S. laws are discussed in detail below in § III. What constitutes sensitive information and what warrants 
federal legislative protection is still much debated, even among privacy utilitarians. Agreeing on an approach 
does not guarantee agreeing on the particulars. Protecting children’s personal information online recently 
garnered widespread support; the benefits of regulating spam are more debatable.  
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with drafting, administering, and enforcing government rules,
119 and the costs related to 
potentially incompetent or corrupt government officials.
120 On the other hand, opt-in rules can 
discourage (through high negotiation costs) willing parties from reaching a better outcome; this 
indicates high flipping costs for federal regulation.  
Now, suppose instead, the government chooses an opt-out regime. If information 
asymmetries exist, such as difficulty in determining whether a Web site has violated its privacy 
policy,
121 then an individual can face sticking costs in terms of unanticipated privacy violations. 
A lack of adequate enforcement mechanisms in the absence of government intervention would 
exacerbate any sticking costs. If negotiating with each Web site to agree on a tolerable level of 
information provision (that is, exercising some level of opt-out) is costly, then individual may 
face high flipping costs as well.
122  
This brief review of potential costs suggests that a case could be made for either regime 
on  theoretical grounds. The utilitarian approach would attempt to address the issue by 
gathering data on actual costs and benefits, choosing the policy with the greatest net benefit. 
This comparison, of course, depends on the specifics at hand: are we discussing an omnibus 
law requiring opt-in or a more targeted rule, say for health records? The utilitarian approach 
need not provide a unique answer, but typically gives the policy maker a concrete set of policy 
options that are grounded in theory and practice.  
Evaluation  
As with all of the other camps discussed above, there are also drawbacks to using a 
utilitarian framework, as the name is defined here.
123 Key among these is the difficulty of 
quantifying many costs and benefits. Some issues are inherently difficult to measure, like what 
privacy is really worth to an individual or how much an individual loses by receiving 
unsolicited (and unwanted) email. Other issues have simply not been adequately addressed, like 
how much companies are currently spending to comply with privacy laws already on the books. 
                                                 
119 Swire, supra note 65, at “Government Failures.” 
120 Id. at “Government Failures and Public Choice Problems.” 
121 Id. at “Market Failures.” 
122 Technological advancements, like P3P (discussed below in § III) may help to reduce the negotiation costs 
associated with exercising opt-out online. 
123 For a discussion of some of the strengths and weaknesses see Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Benefit-Cost Analysis in 
Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation (December 1996) (unpublished manuscript, American Enterprise 
Institute).  
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A second drawback to this approach lies in the fact that it requires re-examining the 
same issues for each piece of potential privacy protection. As Swire notes, “the empirical 
magnitude of these various costs and benefits will vary considerably across industries. The best 
mix of markets, self-regulation, and government regulation will often vary for the distinct 
stages of defining, enforcing, and adjudicating the rules for protecting personal information. At 
each stage, we can examine how self-regulation may be better or worse than a more fully 
market or government approach.”
124 The cost-benefit approach therefore requires a 
considerable amount of effort. It has also been criticized for resulting in an ad hoc patchwork of 
legislation. 
A third drawback to this approach is that it implicitly assumes that every issue can be 
subjected to cost-benefit analysis. There may be some policies, such as slavery, that we as a 
society believe cannot be justified, even if the economic benefits were to far exceed the 
measurable costs. 
Despite these drawbacks, we feel this approach is the best way to ensure economically 
efficient privacy protection for consumers. While we readily admit that economic efficiency 
should not be the only goal of public policy, including privacy legislation, we think it should be 
an important concern.
125 
We employ the cost-benefit framework to review the current crop of proposed online 
privacy laws. But before turning to the costs and benefits of proposed legislation, we examine 
some recent legislation aimed at helping to ensure information privacy for consumers. 
 
III.  Existing Information Privacy Protection: An Overview  
A. Summary of Privacy Legislation 
Governments throughout the world have passed legislation to address information 
privacy issues.  This section focuses on legislation in Europe and the U.S. We find it instructive 
to review the EU legislation prior looking at the U.S. legislation for two reasons. First, 
European rules represent an extreme form of privacy protection and thus make a good 
benchmark. Second, the EU Directive on privacy is an omnibus rule, applying to all industries 
                                                 
124 Swire, supra note 65, at “Conclusions.” 
125 On the growing importance of economic analysis in federal decision making, see Cass Sunstein & Richard 
Pildes, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995).   
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and all kinds of personal information. The U.S. laws, on the other hand, are ad hoc, cover 
specific industries and targeted groups of consumers. 
1.  The European Union Data Protection Directive  
By far the most comprehensive privacy legislation exists in the European Union.
126, 
127 
The Data Protection Directive, which became effective in 1998, was largely designed to 
harmonize the often conflicting national privacy laws in Europe. Germany and France had 
enacted strong governmental privacy protection well before the EU Directive.
128 Italy, Greece, 
and Spain, on the other hand, had no privacy regulations at all on their books when the drafting 
of the Directive first began in the early 1990s.
129 The Directive requires all member states to 
devise national laws that meet minimum standards for protecting the privacy of personal 
information.
130  
The first of these minimum standards is similar to the “functional use” rule discussed by 
Kang.
131 Data can be collected only for specific, legitimate business purposes and may not be 
processed further in any way incompatible with the original purpose.
132 Individuals also have 
the right to know the identities of all parties collecting and using their information. Consistent 
with the Fair Information Practices, the Directive provides for consumer access to personal 
data, the ability to make corrections where necessary, and the opportunity to object to certain 
uses of the information.
133  
                                                 
126 For a more thorough analysis of the EU Privacy Directive than we provide here, see SWIRE & L ITAN, supra 
note 54. The appendix to their book provides the full text of the EU Directive. See also CATE (1997), supra note 
4. 
127 Many other countries outside of the European Union and the United States have enacted privacy laws. Most of 
them fall between the omnibus EU Directive and the sector-specific U.S. laws in terms of the protection they 
offer and the areas they cover. See Table A1 in Appendix A for a list of the privacy laws in various countries 
throughout the world. 
128 SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 54, at 22-23.  
129 Id. at 23. 
130 Some countries, like France, go beyond the minimum rules established by the Directive. Here, we focus on the 
rules prescribed by the EU and do not go into detail on the 15 different implementations of national privacy 
laws. See Table A2 in Appendix A for a brief summary of the individual laws that EU countries have passed to 
meet the Directive. 
131 Kang, supra note 5, at 1249. 
132 SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 54, at 28. 
133 Id. at 29.  
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In general, processing “sensitive data” is altogether prohibited without explicit consent, 
although some complicated exceptions exist.
134 Sensitive data is defined as data “revealing 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union 
membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life.”
135 
The Directive does, however, free the flow of information within the EU. For example, 
member states can n o longer ban the flow of personal information to other states, as France 
threatened to do in the late 1980s with respect to Italy, which at the time had no data protection 
laws.
136 As for the flow of personal information out of the EU, the Directive is much  more 
restrictive. Fearing “data haven” countries outside of Europe that would collect and disseminate 
personal information counter to EU laws, the Directive prohibits trans-border data 
transmissions to countries that do not have “adequate” data protection. Just recently, the U.S. 
negotiated Safe Harbor status with the EU that guarantees companies agreeing to submit to a 
single set of EU rules will qualify as providing “adequate” protection.
137   
Evaluating the EU Directive  
The EU Directive highlights several of the potential pitfalls associated with a 
comprehensive approach to privacy protection laws. First, it suffers from the out-of-date-
technology problem discussed earlier. It was drafted with mainframe computers in mind, where 
a relatively small number of large hierarchical systems store and process data.
138 Information 
technology has shifted dramatically away from a mainframe system, however. In the 
decentralized client-server
139 world of today, the Directive’s language regarding information 
                                                 
134 Id. at 30. 
135 European Union, Directive 95/46/EC, § III.8 Official Journal L281, Nov. 23, 1995 at 0031-0050 (visited Oct. 
25, 2001) <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1995/en_395L0046.html>. 
136 SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 54, at 25. 
137 U.S. Companies that voluntarily adopt the Safe Harbor rules give the FTC authority to fine violators up to 
$12,000 a day if found guilty of a violation. U.S. Companies that do not accept the Safe Harbor terms may face 
prosecution by European regulators if they’re the subject of a complaint by any resident of the 15 EU countries. 
See John Rendleman, Europe’s Eye On Privacy, INFORMATIONWEEK.COM, Jun. 21, 2001 (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.informationweek.com/story/IWK20010621S0003>. 
138 SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 54, at 50. 
139 Client-server networks are not hierarchical. Instead, server computers work together, usually with each server 
fulfilling a specific role. For example, a file server is a computer and storage device dedicated to storing files. 
Any user (i.e. client) on the network can store files on that server. A print server is a computer that manages one 
or more printers, and a network server is a computer that manages network traffic. For more information, see the 
online technical dictionary Webopedia for definitions of client and server (Webopedia,  Clients and Servers 
(visited Sep. 5, 2001) < http://www.pcwebopaedia.com/TERM/s/server.html>, 
<http://www.pcwebopaedia.com/TERM/c/client.html>).   
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“controllers” (i.e., commercial interests collecting and processing information) is much less 
appropriate and can lead to problems both for the companies trying to comply with the rules 
and the enforcement agencies trying to police the rules.
140  
Second, the move towards outsourcing, a significant trend in business for many years 
now, becomes exceedingly difficult under the Directive’s restrictions on transborder 
transmissions. For example, a non-European contractor may need access to a company’s 
internal, secure Web site to view design work. If personal data like the names and business 
telephone numbers of employees working on the contractor’s project reside on that site as well, 
no access can be granted.
141  
Moreover, the data transmission problem and the out-of-date-technology issue are 
interconnected. Technologies like Intranets are designed to facilitate the flow of information 
within an organization, regardless of the national boundaries between subsidiaries or 
contractors. The barriers erected by the Directive, however, may mean “… new information 
technologies might be adopted sooner in other countries than Europe.”
142 Taking this argument 
a step further, “…there is also the possibility that strict data protection rules in Europe, coupled 
with less strict rules in other countries, will pose a competitive disadvantage for Europe. The 
risk is that Europe will fall behind in creating the information society.”
143 
The Directive raises other concerns as well. In the earlier discussion on the benefits of 
information sharing we argued that new entrants compete more effectively by purchasing 
existing customer databases. In contrast, some large European national banks and industrial 
concerns supported the new privacy laws: “by restricting the availability of information about 
customers, privacy laws help to protect established business from competition from other 
countries or start-ups.”
144 
                                                 
140 SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 54, at 50-75. 
141 Id. at 63. 
142 Id. at 93. 
143 Id. at 151. 
144 CATE (2000), supra note 20, at  14. Walter Kitchenman extends this argument, claiming that the European 
privacy laws represent barriers to entry in the finance industry. “As a result, financial services are provided by 
far fewer institutions––one tenth the number serving U.S. customers, despite the fact that the pan-European 
market has almost one and one-half times as many households” (WALTER KITCHENMAN, THE TOWER GROUP, 
U.S. C REDIT REPORTING: PERCEIVED BENEFITS OUTWEIGH PRIVACY C ONCERNS (Jan. 1999) (visited Sep. 4, 
2001) <http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/research.shtml>).  
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While the Directive rules imply a strict opt-in regime, the EU has yet to enforce this 
policy.
145 Walter Kitchenman observes, as currently enforced, “nothing distinguishes [the EU 
policy] from ‘opt-out.’”
146 Cate and Staten argue that the lack of enforcement stems from the 
fact that European “government officials realize the blow that an ‘opt-in’ requirement would 
deal to European economic performance.”
147 
2.  Key U.S. Privacy Legislation  
While the U.S. has not enacted sweeping privacy protection laws similar to the EU 
Directive, it does have several laws on the books protecting information privacy in specific 
areas. We discuss several of these below, all of which apply to online privacy. Because our 
focus is on business-to-consumer transactions, we do not review the laws restricting the federal 
government’s collection, use and disclosure of personal information.
148, 
149 After discussing the 
terms of the enacted legislation, we evaluate their effectiveness in protecting information 
privacy. 
Table 2 summarizes several of the enacted bills discussed below. In particular, the table 
highlights the focus of the bills, such as the industry or consumer group targeted, and the 
primary aspects of the legislation. The table reveals that several of the enacted bills have not 
been successful in protecting privacy. One conclusion that can be drawn from our analysis of 
                                                 
145 One recent study found that 80 percent of European Web sites do not even provide customers with an opt-out 
mechanism. In contrast, around 60 percent of popular U.S. based sites offer opt-out.  See Ben Vickers, Europe 
Lags Behind U.S. on Web Privacy, More American Firms Let Customers Guard Data, Study Finds, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 20, 2001. 
146 KITCHENMAN, supra note 144. 
147 CATE & STATEN (2001), supra note 68. 
148 For example, the Privacy Act of 1974, limits the ability of the government to collect, maintain, and release 
information about its citizens. For more information, see The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552A (1974) 
(visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/privstat>. 
149 Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, many lawmakers pushed for broader law enforcement authority in 
pursuing and arresting potential terrorists. This necessarily involved an increased government authority to 
observe private citizens. For example, S. 1510 (introduced in the Senate on October 11, 2001) and H.R. 2975 
(introduced in the House on October 12, 2001) both call for increased authority to intercept wire, electronic, and 
oral communications. One of these bills is expected to be signed into law before the end of 2001. While 
proponents argue that government needs expanded powers to protect America from further terrorist attacks, civil 
rights groups have voiced concerns over the impact on innocent people. For example, the ACLU notes that the 
new law will remove “judicial oversight from the process, and isn't limited to terrorism cases. Innocent targets 
would never know of surveillance, and libraries and Internet cafes could authorize blanket wiretapping of their 
customers.”  See Am. Civ. Liberties Union,  Surveillance Powers: A Chart (visited Oct. 24, 2001) 
<http://www.aclu.org/congress/patriot_chart.html>.  
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current privacy legislation is that drafting a policy that provides the desired benefits without 
resulting in any significant negative or unintended consequences is a difficult task.  
a.  Information Fraud Protection 
One of the most serious privacy concerns is that personal information will be misused 
or stolen.
150 Identity theft is already a federal crime in the U.S. under the Identity Theft Act of 
1998, with penalties of up to 15 years of imprisonment and $250,000 in fines.
151 Under this 
Act, victims of identity theft may also seek restitution if there is a conviction. As for credit card 
number theft, false charge rules limit a consumer’s liability to $50 per card and thus places the 
onus of finding and stopping instances of credit card fraud onto card issuers.
152 
b.  Protection for Sensitive Information 
The U.S. has several laws targeted at the protection of particularly sensitive information 
or at-risk groups. For example, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA) 
protects children under 13 from the online collection of personal data.
153 Sites covered by 
COPPA must: 1.  post a clear and conspicuous privacy policy; 2. notify parents of its 
information practices; 3. with certain exceptions, obtain verifiable parental consent before 
collecting, using or disclosing personal information from children; and 4. provide parental 
access to their children’s information, plus the capability to delete such information and to opt-
out of future collection. The Act also places strict rules on children’s participation in public 
forum, like chat rooms or bulletin boards.
154 Thus the rule applies both to operators of child-
specific sites as well as any general interest site that has actual knowledge that it is collecting 
information from children under 13 years old. 
                                                 
150 In fact, several of the terrorists involved in the September 11 attacks used stolen identities. See Larry Ellison, 
Digital Ids Can Help Prevent Terrorism, W ALL S T. J., Oct 8, 2001, at A26 (visited Oct. 24, 2001) 
<http://www.oracle.com/corporate/index.html?digitalid.html>. 
151 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 1028, supra note 9. For state identification 
theft laws, see Identity Theft: State Laws (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/statelaw.htm>. 
152 “Charge back” rules prevent credit card issuers from charging consumers for purchases they did not make. See 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. 1693.  
153 For additional information, see Center for Democracy and Tech., Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 
1998 (COPPA) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.cdt.org/legislation/105th/privacy/coppa.html>. 
154 For example, Web site operators must employ full-time monitors for chat rooms to ensure that children’s 
privacy is protected.  
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The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, which was amended in 1996 as the Consumer 
Credit Reporting Reform Act place restrictions on credit agencies.  For example, they prohibit 
credit agencies from making customers’ personal credit report information public or sharing the 
information without legitimate business need,
155 although there a re no limits on what 
information may be collected. The two Acts also require information accuracy and access. 
Credit agencies must provide individuals with a copy of their credit report free of charge if the 
report results in an adverse decision (such as credit, employment, or insurance denial). 
The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, commonly referred to as the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, provides additional privacy protection for financial data.
156 One 
controversial aspect of this Act is the privacy policy notification rules: notice must be provided 
to each customer individually; group forum like Web sites are not considered adequate. Notice 
must also be made annually, even if none of the company’s practices have changed and no new 
information has been collected.
157 In addition to notice, the Act requires financial institutions to 
give customers an opportunity to prohibit, or opt-out of, information disclosures to 
nonaffiliated third parties 
For the protection of health records and personal medical information, The Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) contains a section on the 
standards for health records privacy.
158 Under the direction of HIPAA, the Department of 
Health and Human Services published its final Privacy Rule in December 2000.
159 The rule 
defines an opt-in choice mechanism for health information. It gives patients greater access to 
their own medical records and more control over how their personal health information is used. 
The rule also prohibits health providers and payers from conditioning service on the provision 
of personal information not necessary for treatment.
160 
                                                 
155 The 1996 Act updates the FCRA by narrowing the definition of “legitimate business need” to a “business 
transaction that is initiated by the consumer” or needed “to review an account to determine whether the 
consumer continues to meet the terms of the account” (FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, supra note 40. See also CATE 
(1997), supra note 4, at 82-83). 
156 For additional information, see Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,  Information on the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.senate.gov/~banking/conf/>. 
157 CATE (2000), supra note 20, at 30-33. 
158 For additional information, see Health Care Financing Administration, The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Page (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.hcfa.gov/hipaa/hipaahm.htm >. 
159 Health Care Financing Administration,  The HIPAA Privacy Rule (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/hipaa/adminsim/privacy.htm>. 
160 CATE (2000), supra note 20, at 37.  
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c.  Protection Against Monitoring and Surveillance 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) governs the monitoring 
of electronic communications, such as telephone calls or email.
161 It prohibits the interception 
or disclosure of the contents of any electronic communication. While this Act is aimed 
primarily at government abuses, it also covers eavesdropping by private parties.
162 The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 expanded on the ECPA’s privacy protection by including 
provisions that protect the “transactional” aspects of electronic communication, such as 
telephone numbers or time, place and duration of the call.
163 The Wireless Communications 
and Public Safety Act of 1999, which established 9-1-1 as the national emergency number, 
specifically protects against unauthorized use of geographic location information.
164, 
165 
d.  Other Privacy Protection 
As mentioned earlier, The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 is one of the earliest 
laws with privacy elements. The Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive” business practices and 
allows for private lawsuits.
166Many state laws also provide additional information privacy 
protection. For example, Colorado, Idaho, Missouri, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and 
Washington all have anti-spam laws regulating the sending of unsolicited emails.
167 These laws 
                                                 
161 For more information, see Jones Telecommunications and Multimedia Encyclopedia,  Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (visited Sep. 6, 2001) <http://www.digitalcentury.com/encyclo/update/ecpa.html>. 
162 One complication is that it only applies to instances where the participants have an expectation that the 
communication is not subject to interception. Communications that are readily accessible by the general public, 
like any marine or aeronautical systems, amateur and citizens band radio, and mobile radio services are all 
exempt. 
163 Federal Communications Commission,  Telecommunications Act of 1996 (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.fcc.gov/telecom.html>. Service providers are free to use this type of information to protect their 
own business interests, but may not disclose the information to outside parties. 
164 For additional information, see ComCare Alliance,  ComCare: Privacy (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.comcare.org/research/topics/privacy.html>. 
165 The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 provides extensive protection of privacy as it relates to cable 
television service provides. See The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1984) (visited 
Sep. 4, 2001) < http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/47/551.html>. See also CATE (1997), supra note 4, at 85. 
The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 prohibits the disclosure of video rental information (like movie titles) 
and requires the destruction of personally identifiable information no later than one year after it is obtained. The 
Customer Proprietary Network Information rules restrict the use of customer information by telephone 
companies, both internally and via disclosure to third parties. For a link to the FCC order regarding Customer 
Proprietary Network Information, see Federal Trade Commission,  Before the Federal Communications 
Commission (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1998/fcc98027.txt>. 
166 For additional information, see U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Federal Trade Commission Act (visited 
Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.fda.gov/opacom/laws/ftca.htm>. 
167 Washington: HB 1037, 1999; Colorado: HB 1309, 2000; Idaho: HB 505, 2000; Missouri: SB 763, 2000;  
Pennsylvania: SB262, 2000;  Tennessee: SB 2995, 2000; and, Nevada: SB 13, 1997.  For charts and summaries 
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often require companies sending spam to provide a return address or toll-free number that 
recipients can use to opt-out of future solicitations. California and Virginia have comprehensive 
laws providing for the protection of information privacy, such as subscriber information and tax 
return data.
168 
e.  Enforcement and Effectiveness of Enacted Legislation 
The effectiveness of these various laws differs. Some, like the federal identity theft law, 
get a positive review; others, like Gramm-Leach-Bliley appear more questionable as effective 
tools for information privacy protection. Here we review the laws individually, discussing the 
positives and the negatives that have surfaced thus far.  
The Identity Theft Act of 1998 is sufficiently powerful to arrest and sentence 
offenders,
169 but many privacy advocates feel more should be done to aid in catching offenders 
in the first place.
170 Even when violators are caught and imprisoned the victim is left with the 
aftermath of the crime. As one news story reported, “It’s the same for the 800,000 other victims 
every year who have their identities stolen. They face months, and even years, of trying to clear 
their names…”
171 In particular, victims must obtain police reports and case numbers for each 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
of state privacy legislation, see Pam Greenberg & Heather Morton, 1999 Information Technology and Internet 
Laws, 2000 (unpublished manuscript, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures); Randall Jackson, Information Technology 
and Internet Laws Passed in 1998, 2000 (unpublished manuscript, N at’l Conf. St. Legislatures); Randall 
Jackson, Information Technology and Internet Laws Passed – 1997, 2000 (unpublished manuscript, Nat’l Conf. 
St. Legislatures); Heather Morton, 2000 Information and Technology Internet Laws, 2000 (unpublished 
manuscript, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures);  Heather Morton, 1999 Enactments Related to Internet Privacy, 2000 
(unpublished manuscript, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures); and, Heather Morton, 2001 State Legislation Related to 
Internet Privacy, 2000 (unpublished manuscript, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures).   
168 California: AB 2246, 2000, SB 1724, 1000; and, Virginia: HB 2152, 1999.   
169 FirstGov for Consumers,  Identity Theft: Cases and Scams (visited Oct. 24, 2001) 
<http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/cases.htm> for a list of pending federal identity theft cases. 
170  New identity theft legislation was recently introduced in both the House and Senate. For example, the Identity 
Theft Prevention Act of 2001 would require banks and credit bureaus to take additional steps to protect their 
customers’ sensitive personal information. In particular, the bill requires credit card issuers to notify customers 
when additional cards are requested in relation to an address change and requires credit bureaus to alert card 
issuers when there are discrepancies in the customer address information at the bureau and the card issuer. In 
addition, the bill would allow the FTC to impose fines against credit issuers who do not heed fraud alert 
precautions. For additional information, see S. 1399, 107
th Cong. (2001) (visited Sep. 26, 2001) 
<http://thomas.loc.gov> (enter the bill number to pull up the text of the proposed Acts (i.e., type S. 1399 to see 
the Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2001).) 
171 Susan Clary,  It’s Tough to Try to Prove Who You Are––Or Aren’t, ORLANDOSENTINEL.COM, Aug. 21, 2001 
(visited Sep. 4, 2001) < http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/local/orl-idtheft082101.story>. Regarding the 
prevalence of identity theft (reported as 800,000 a year in the news article), the FBI reports a significantly 
smaller figure: 350,000 cases a year.  See Opting for Privacy, C HRISTIAN S CI. MONITOR, Sep. 26, 2001. A 
General Accounting Office report details the difficulty in determining this figure. The report states that no 
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instance of fraud in order to prove their innocence with employers and creditors. Even though 
they are not expected to pay debts incurred by their impersonators, they must make corrections 
through each and every lender rather than through a central credit bureau.  
The federal government does provide help for people who are victims of identity theft. 
For example, the Social Security Administration
172 and the Federal Trade Commission
173 both 
run fraud hotlines.  In addition, the government administers an identity theft Web site that 
supplies, among other things, a uniform identity theft Model Report Form that is accepted by 
all three major credit bureaus as well as many financial institutions.
174 By reducing the number 
of forms needed from dozens to one, the FTC form should considerably reduce the amount of 
paperwork needed to restore credit and proper identity.
175   
It is difficult to see how additional legislation could ease the burden placed on identity 
theft victims.
176 For example, relaxing rules for re-establishing credit would lead to abuses by 
people who were not really victims, but merely wanted to avoid credit card charges or to clear 
their records of unpleasant details.
177 
It is important to note that identity theft and credit card theft are not Internet crimes per 
se. In fact, both are more prevalent in the offline world. The typical crime involves a stranger 
stealing the information from your wallet or purse or someone you know abusing your trust.
178 
The Internet usually enters not in how the personal information is obtained but in how the thief 
uses a stolen identity, such as shopping online with a false credit card. Moreover, creditors and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
comprehensive statistics are available, but that selected federal agencies track violations to particular sections of 
the U.S. Code. See G EN. ACCT. OFF., IDENTITY FRAUD, INFORMATION ON PREVALENCE, COST, AND INTERNET 
IMPACT I S L IMITED (visited Sep. 4, 2001) < http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:gg98100b.pdf>.  
172 The telephone number for the SSA hotline is (800) 269-0271, the fax number is (410) 597-0881, and the email 
address is oig.hotline@ssa.gov.  
173 The FTC hotline number is (877) ID-Theft. 
174 For the federal identity Web site, see FirstGov for Consumers, supra note 169. See the discussion of this site, 
plus the two hotlines, in Don Oldenburg, Avoid an Identity Crisis, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2001, at C12.  
175 Comments made by Senator Feinstein during the introduction of the Identity Theft and Prevention Act of 2001 
(visited Sep. 26, 2001) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?r107:@OR+(+@1(S.+1399)++)>.  
176 As noted above, proposed legislation is aimed at improving security at credit bureaus and credit issuers. The 
FTC’s standardized form simplifies consumer paperwork, but does not relax any of the steps consumers must 
take to restore their identity and credit. 
177 As a Florida prosecutor noted, “We get a lot of excuses from people who say they didn’t do it” (Clary, supra 
note 171). 
178 Lee Bergquist, Identities Under Fire in Widespread Thefts, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 19, 2001.  
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merchants already have strong incentives to stop fraud. The American Bankers Association 
estimates that credit card fraud cost financial institutions alone $689 million in 1999.
179 
Another bill aimed at protecting financial information, the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 
1970 (FCRA), is f ocused on protecting individual’s rights as they pertain to credit reporting. 
While providing broad protection, the Act had been criticized for containing numerous 
loopholes. For example, FCRA prohibited the disclosure of most out-of-date information 
(collected more than seven to ten years ago, depending on the information), but made an 
exception for requests in connection with an employment application for a job with a salary in 
excess of $20,000, a credit transaction over $50,000, or a life insurance policy of over 
$50,000.
180 While these amounts may have been reasonable in 1970, they had never been 
adjusted for inflation. The Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act, however, closed this and 
several other loopholes, providing stronger protection of consumers’ credit information.
181  The 
two bills demonstrate that credit history privacy can be balanced with the efficient flow of 
information.
182 As discussed above, the availability of credit information makes getting loans 
easier and faster for consumers, and safer for lenders.  
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 also appears successful in adapting to 
protect privacy online. Enacted long before the Internet was even conceived, the FTC Act has 
already been used as an online privacy enforcement mechanism. The courts have interpreted 
the Act’s “unfair and deceptive” business practices sections as applying to companies’ privacy 
policies.
183 With a majority of Web sites based in the U.S. posting privacy notices, this Act 
provides broad federal recourse for consumers who  feel that companies have violated their 
stated policies.
184  
                                                 
179 Citing id. 
180 FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, supra note 40. See CATE (1997), supra note 4, at 82. 
181 The 1996 amendment also tightened the definition of “legitimate business need” for information sharing, as 
noted earlier. Cate discusses several other loopholes closed by the amendment (id. at 82). 
182 The FTC announced in the fall of 2001 that it intends to step up its efforts to prosecute violators of the FCRA, 
as well as increase the enforcement of all privacy laws already on the books. See John Schwartz, F.T.C. Plans to 
Abandon New Bills on Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2001, at A5.  
183 CATE (2000), supra note 20, at 28; Jacobus, supra note 88. Of course, the “unfair and deceptive” practices 
clause has its limitations. For example, the FTC has thus far not attempted to make companies live up to their 
original privacy policy. If a Web site’s policy is found to be deceptive, it may be enough for the company to 
change the policy. See Jeffrey Benner, FTC Powerless to Protect Privacy, WIRED NEWS, May 31, 2001 (visited 
Sep. 17, 2001) <http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,44173,00.html >.     
184 The FTC found that 100 of the “most popular” and over 80 percent of U.S. based Web sites in general post a 
privacy policy. We discuss this in greater detail in § IV. See FED. TRADE COMMISSION (2000), supra note 16.  
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Some of the targeted U.S. acts, however, provide protection for specific areas but also 
appear to have far-reaching unintended consequences. For example, the Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) appears to be changing marketing practices aimed at children 
under 13,
185,186 but it has also led to restrictions in interactive online services. Zeeks.com, an 
award-winning games and entertainment Web site for kids ages 6 to 13, announced that it 
would remove all of its interactive elements, from e-mail to chat rooms, because of COPPA 
compliance costs.
187 To comply with COPPA, Zeeks CEO Steven G. Bryan said the company 
had to employ about a dozen chat room monitors to oversee activity in a pair of chat rooms 
available 12 hours a day. Bryan said the $200,000 per year it would cost Zeeks to employ the 
supervisors, monitor phone lines to answer parents' questions and process COPPA permission 
forms was simply too much to justify maintaining the interactive services.
188  
In contrast, there are some privacy bills that may not even serve their intended purpose. 
For example, Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) is meeting mixed reviews––critics claim it is 
inundating consumers with paper but not providing any meaningful privacy enhancements. 
Even the new chairman of the FTC, Timothy J. Muris, is skeptical of the benefits of GLB. 
“Acres of trees died to produce a blizzard of barely comprehensible privacy notice,” Muris 
noted.
189 To comply with GLB, around 40,000 financial institutions mailed approximately 2.5 
billion privacy policy notices to consumers by June 2001; on average, households received 20 
to 50 different notices, each with its own wording and format.
190 For example, FleetBoston 
                                                 
185 COPPA has been in effect for a little over a year. A majority of Web sites targeted at children appear to be 
complying with most of its provisions. A study conducted by the University of Pennsylvania early in 2001 found 
that among 162 child-oriented sites reviewed, 90 percent were posting a privacy policy link on their home 
pages. It was not entirely clear whether the other ten percent were aimed at children. Of course, this highlights a 
problem with the bill: how should affected sites be defined, by content or by actual visitors? The study did 
uncover some minor violations, such as Web sites not informing parents they have the right to review their 
child’s personal information. See Joseph Turow, Privacy Policies on Children’s Websites: Do They Play By the 
Rules? (Mar. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, The Annenberg Public Policy Center of the Univ. of 
Pennsylvania).  
186 The FTC has filed a handful of cases against Web sites allegedly not complying with COPPA rules. For a list of 
pending cases, see Arent Fox,  Online Privacy Law (visited Oct. 24, 2001) 
<http://www.arentfox.com/additionalsites/e-privacy/e-privacynews/privacy-2000/privacy-2000.html>. 
187 Ben Charney, The cost of COPPA: Kids' site stops talking, ZDNET NEWS, Sep. 13, 2000 (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0%2C4586%2C2627742%2C00.html>.  
188 Costs like these do not invalidate the need for legislation protecting at-risk groups. Nonetheless, in considering 
whether to pass a proposed bill, all of the costs must be weighed against the perceived benefits. 
189 Rob Blackwell, FTC Unveils Stepped-Up Privacy Plan, AM. BANKER, Oct. 5, 2001. 
190 CATE (2000), supra note 20, at 53.  
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Financial Corporation was required to send a separate policy for each of its five divisions.
191 
Muris concludes that “…this is a statute only lawyers could love––until they found out it 
applied to them.”
192 
It is unclear whether individuals are even reading these notices carefully. Surprisingly, a 
recent Wall Street Journal survey indicates that individuals are reading and understanding each 
of these numerous policies. Company experience (and common sense), however, seems to 
indicate otherwise. For example, Fleet set up a toll-free number to handle inquiries about the 
statements, but the response rate has thus far been much lower than anticipated. Fleet’s Chief 
Privacy Officer, Agnes Bundy-Scanlan, suspects the low inquiry rate has to do with the fact 
that “during the past few months, consumers have received so many privacy statements that 
they aren’t reading them or taking the time to respond.”
193 Interviews conducted by the 
American Banker corroborate this point: few of the consumers interviewed had even looked 
twice at the privacy notices sent by their financial institutions and, in fact, “were not even sure 
what these were.”
194 As Cate points out, “A rational inquiry would ask whether that annual 
onslaught of legal notices materially advanced consumer privacy, and if so, whether that 
benefit was worth the  multibillion-dollar price tag or whether the same degree of privacy 
protection could have been achieved by requiring financial institutions to post their privacy 
notices prominently or make them available to customers without charge on request.”
195  
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) provides an example 
of a bill that opponents argue is poorly designed and overreaching in its privacy protection. 
Under its privacy rules, information sharing is based entirely on individual consent––but the 
rules apply even to the deceased. Moreover, the bill may have unintended consequences. Cate 
argues that HIPAA regulations “threaten medical research and the development of new drugs 
and treatments.”
196 When individuals insist on the privacy of their  own information, they 
transfer the burden of providing needed data for medical research to others, which costs the 
                                                 
191 Eileen Colkin, Privacy Law Requires Hard Work, INFORMATIONWEEK.COM, Aug. 20, 2001 (visited Sep. 4, 
2001) <http://www.informationweek.com/thisweek/story/IWK20010816S0006>.  
192 Blackwell, supra note 189. 
193 Colkin, supra note 191. 
194 W.A. Lee, Managing Privacy: A Consumer Perspective on Financial Privacy, AM. BANKER, Sep. 4, 2001. 
195 Complying with GLB’s privacy policy notification rules has already cost financial institutions between $2 and 
$5 billion. We discuss this cost and others in more detail in § IV. See CATE (2000), supra note 20, at 53. 
196 Id. at 54.  
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entire community.
197 Costs like these may be the price we have to pay in order to protect 
sensitive data like our health records, but that tradeoff should be explicit in debates over future 
health care privacy bills. Even consumers who value privacy highly may see the price as too 
steep and would thus be willing to settle for weaker rules, such as opt-out opportunities as 
opposed to opt-in.
198  
HIPAA also seems likely to cost health care providers a great deal in compliance. For 
example, the privacy policy notice rules alone are nine pages.
199 While the Department of 
Health and Human Services estimates compliance for the industry will cost only $3.2 billion 
for the first year (2001) and $17.6 billion for the first ten years, industry experts estimate much 
higher costs.
200 Based on a previous, less-complicated version of the bill than was eventually 
passed, health care consulting companies calculate compliance costs for HIPAA at $25-$43 
billion for just the first five years, not including any impact on medical research or liability 
payments.
201 
Other bills are criticized by privacy advocates for being too limited and too ad hoc.
202 
For example, the Wireless Communications Act of 1999 applies only to cell phones and other 
wireless communications.
203 And the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) contains 
a serious loophole: not preventing communications providers from disclosing the transactional 
information related to electronic communications, just the contents of those communications. 
Thus, under ECPA telephone companies could disclose the existence of a communication, the 
parties communicating, the number dialed, and the time of the transmission to anyone other 
than a government entity.
204 As mentioned above, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 places 
additional limits on the transactional information that communications companies can disclose, 
                                                 
197 Id. (citing Helena Gail Rubinstein, If I Am Only for Myself, What Am I? A Communitarian Look at the Privacy 
Stalemate, 25 AM. J. L. & MED. 203 (1999).) 
198 For details of the HIPAA consent requirements, see 65 Fed. Reg. 200 at 82765. 
199 CATE (2000), supra note 20, at 53-54. 
200 See 65 FR, supra note 198, at table 1. 
201 C ATE (1997),  supra note 4, at 54 (citing Robert E. Nolan Company, Inc.,  Common Components of 
Confidentiality Legislation––Cost and Impact Analysis (1999); Fitch IBCA, HIPAA: Wake-Up Call for Health 
Care Providers (2000); and, Barbara Kirchheimer,  Report Predicts Huge HIPAA Price Tag, M OD. 
HEALTHCARE, Oct. 2, 2000, at 48). 
202 Kang, supra note 5, at 1230. 
203 Similarly, the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 applies only to cable television. Critics argue that it is 
unclear whether the Act will extend to recent interactive uses of the cable network, like Internet connections for 
home PCs. See id. at 1235. 
204 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2703. See also id. at 1234-1235.  
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thus it closes much of this loophole in the ECPA. Exceptions do remain, however: service 
providers are still free to disclose transactional data for their own business purposes and an 
exemption is in place for telephone directories.
205  
Complaints about the patchwork of regulations governing information privacy in the 
U.S. notwithstanding, there are valid reasons for supporting a selective approach to information 
privacy protection. Passing laws one at a time, for specific areas, allows for a more careful 
evaluation of issues. In principle, such laws are less prone to––although certainly not immune 
from––unintended consequences. This approach also allows (at least in theory) for lawmakers 
to consider the costs and benefits that each proposed act is likely to entail. After enough time 
for evaluation, those laws that are seen as not covering enough ground may be amended, as was 
the case with both the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act. With the federal government, enacting legislation in an incremental fashion is easier than 
eliminating bad policy once it is on the books. 
While some privacy advocates would argue that state regulations fill gaps in the ad hoc 
federal protection of information privacy––and can even promote additional federal legislation–
–the growing amount of such legislation  is likely to yield inefficiencies. States can have an 
incentive to adopt laws that benefit its own constituents to the detriment of out-of-state 
producers.
206 Considering the interstate (and indeed, inter-country) nature of the Internet, state-
level legislation seems more likely to obstruct online commerce without providing balanced 
privacy protection for the nation as a whole.
207 Moreover, Rubin and Lenard argue that states 
are less likely to employ economic cost-benefit analysis in debating potential bills, and thus 
may end up causing more consumer harm than they prevent.
208 
                                                 
205 CATE (1997), supra note 4, at 85. 
206 Richard Posner makes this point in arguing against state action in antitrust cases: “A situation in which the 
benefits of government action are concentrated in one state and the costs in other states is  a recipe for 
irresponsible state action…The federal government, having a larger and more diverse constituency, is, as James 
Madison recognized in arguing for the benefits of a large republic, less subject to takeover by a faction” 
(Richard Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (2001).) 
207 Even at the national level (or supranational level, such as with the European Union), there is an incentive to 
impose costs on third parties. In principle a world body could deal with this issue. We are not advocating such a 
body.  In many instances, countries can cooperate amongst themselves to reduce problems with the Internet (and 
non-Internet) world, such as identity theft. 
208 RUBIN & LENARD, supra note 70, at 81.  
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B.  Tools for Protecting Privacy   
There are several technologies available to consumers wanting more information 
privacy protection than the current U.S. laws provide.
209 For example, anonymous remailer 
services allow you to send emails on the Internet without revealing your true identity or your 
real email address.
210 Other services enable end users to surf the Web anonymously.
211 And 
software is available to filter out unsolicited email.
212 For example, filters can block individual 
emails on the basis of the sender’s email address or on the basis of words in the subject line or 
body of the message. Some email services, such as Microsoft’s Hotmail, assist in email 
filtering at the user’s option by sending email to a “bulk folder” if the email is not specifically 
addressed but instead contains numerous hidden addresses. 
To protect the content of your Internet transmissions, such as emails or credit card 
information, encryption programs scramble the message and require a key to do the 
unscrambling.
213 For instance, with public key encryption, someone wanting to send a secure 
message to you first scrambles it with your “public” key––this is the portion of your key that is 
made publicly available. To read the m essage, you decode it using your “private” key that is 
known only to you.
214  
When privacy advocates speak of Web sites’ monitoring a visitors’ every move, they 
are frequently referring to “cookies.” A cookie is a text file placed on your computer by a Web 
site to provide you with more personalized service.
215 For example, visitors to 
                                                 
209 Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) lists several privacy tools on its website. See Electronic Privacy 
Information Center,  EPIC Online Guide to Practical Privacy Tools (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.epic.org/privacy/tools.html>. 
210 For example, see Global Internet Liberty Campaign, supra note 6. 
211 For example, a software package called Freedom, promises to “Protect your PC from malicious hackers; 
prevent Web sites from tracking your activities; secure your passwords and personal information; and block 
unwanted ads” (Freedom  – Internet Privacy & Internet Security, Internet Privacy Suite (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.freedom.net/>). 
212 CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., CATO INSTITUTE, WHY CANNING “SPAM” IS A BAD IDEA 5 (Jul. 26, 2001) (visited 
Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-408es.html>.  
213 For example, Fortify offers cryptography for Netscape Web browsers (available for free to non-commercial 
users). See Fortify, Fortify for Netscape (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.fortify.net/intro.html>. 
214 Kang argues, however, that the U.S. government could gain access to private keys. The export of strong 
encryption technology is also substantially regulated. See Kang, supra note 5, at 1244. Also note that encryption 
technology only protects the content of the transmission; the transmission information itself (like source and 
destination) is still open to monitoring unless anonymous remailers are employed. 
215 According to the online technical dictionary Webopaedia, “The main purpose of cookies is to identify users and 
possibly prepare customized Web pages for them. When you enter a Web site using cookies, you may be asked 
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www.weather.com can set up a “My Weather” page that reports local conditions for the 
geographic area chosen.
216 Along with their more innocuous uses, however, critics worry that 
“Cookies can generate profiles of your visiting habits––monitoring what pages you visit and 
what you access.”
217 Advertisers may also use them to accumulate Internet user data and build 
user profiles.  
Consumers already h ave several options to disarm cookies. Most Web browsers, like 
Netscape’s Navigator and Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, can be set to disable or warn users 
about cookies.
218 “Cookie Buster” software also helps to limit this kind of surveillance by 
helping you to find and delete cookies from your hard disk
219 or by preventing Web sites from 
ever placing cookies on your hard disk without your explicit consent.
220 Of course, to gain 
protection from potential surveillance through cookies, users must give up the personalized 
Internet experience that they offer.
221 
One problem with privacy tools like those discussed above is that the individual is 
responsible for coordinating all the different aspects of her privacy protection. She must read 
each privacy notice and elect to opt-out at those Web sites offering a choice, and perhaps not 
use sites that don’t offer opt-out.
222 An upcoming technology may alleviate this problem by 
drastically reducing the transaction costs associated with negotiating privacy protection. The 
Platform for Privacy Preference (P3P), designed by the World Wide Web Consortium, could 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
to fill out a form providing such information as your name and interests. This information is packaged into a 
cookie and sent to your Web browser which stores it for later use. The next time you go to the same Web site, 
your browser will send the cookie to the Web server. The server can use this information to present you with 
custom Web pages. So, for example, instead of seeing just a generic welcome page you might see a welcome 
page with your name on it” (Webopedia,  Cookie (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
http://www.pcwebopaedia.com/TERM/c/cookie.html>). 
216 This is an optional service; the Web site informs the consumer that a cookie is used. 
217 For example, The Limit Software is a company that develops software to prevent cookie use by Web sites. See 
The Limit Software, Cookie Crusher (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.thelimitsoft.com/cookie.html>. 
218 A study of server traffic found that cookies were disabled only 0.68 percent of the time in a billion page-views. 
See HARPER & SINGLETON, supra note 8, at 7 (citing Caught With the Cookie Jar, NAT’L J. TECH. DAILY AM 
ED., Apr. 4, 2001, at 4). 
219 See, for example, MagicCookie Monster, from Dr. Jon’s Software.  See Dr. Jon’s Software,  MagicCookie 
Monster (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://download.at/drjsoftware>. 
220 For example, Cookie Crusher helps the user to determine what a cookie does, making it easier to block cookies 
that track personal information. See The Limit Software, supra note 217. 
221 For a discussion of this tradeoff, see Art Pfenning, Personalization: Delicate Balance, INTERNETWEEK.COM, 
Aug. 27, 2001 (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.internetweek.com/eresearch01/data082701.htm >.  
222 Kang argues that in addition to the effort these methods of privacy protection require, they also tend to favor 
the well informed, computer-savvy over the average user. See Kang, supra note 5, at 1245.  
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standardize Web sites’ privacy notices in computer-readable code.
223 Individuals would then 
use a P3P questionnaire to create their own computer file with desired privacy options, like 
only report physical address information when needed for a transaction and prevent its further 
use (i.e., opt-out). When going online, the individual’s P3P privacy preferences file would 
interact with the Web site’s policy file, machine-to-machine, without the individual having to 
search for the policy or negotiate for opt-out herself.
224  
Thus federal legislation is not the only route for protecting information privacy on line. 
In addition to the numerous laws already on the books, several technological tools exist for 
consumers to protect their privacy online. As commerce on the World Wide Web grows, we 
can expect additional privacy tools to emerge in response to consumer demand. 
 
IV.  New Information Privacy Protection: Reviewing and Evaluating Proposed 
Legislation  
A. Proposed Information Privacy Laws 
Many privacy protection advocates feel the current laws and technology tools do not go 
far enough in protecting individuals’ information privacy online. As a result, a multitude of 
proposed laws have been put  forth in recent years in an attempt to strengthen U.S. federal 
protection of Internet privacy. Below, we discuss several of the proposals that have been made 
by current lawmakers that address privacy online explicitly or in combination with offline 
privacy. After summarizing the proposals, the next section evaluates the costs and benefits of 
legislation.  
Table 3 summarizes several of the key proposed regulations. In particular, it briefly 
describes the terms of the bill, notes whether it is targeted at a particular type of information or 
                                                 
223 P3P is an industry led standard “that enables web sites to express their privacy practices in a standardized 
format that can be automatically retrieved and interpreted by user agents.” W3C members include AOL, AT&T, 
Citigroup, Hewlett Packard, IBM, Microsoft, NCR, NEC, and Netscape, to just to name a few.  See W3C 
Platform for Privacy Preferences Initiative,  P3P and Privacy on the Web FAQ (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.w3.org/P3P/p3pfaq.html>. 
224 As Lawrence Lessig points out, with P3P “…machines can bear the costs of this negotiation.   Machines, that 
is, could be our agents for protecting our privacy” (Lessig (1998), supra note 57, at 18). Opponents to P3P argue 
that even machine-to-machine negotiations may be too complicated and require too many privacy sacrifices on 
the part of consumers. For example, see Electronic Privacy Information Center,  Pretty Poor Privacy: An 
Assessment of P3P and Internet Privacy (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.epic.org/Reports/prettypoorprivacy.html>.  
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a specific group of consumers, and presents a short evaluation of whether the bill is likely to 
achieve its goals as written. We find that many of the proposed bills have broad requirements 
that could make it quite costly for Web sites to comply. Moreover, some of the proposed bills 
have clauses that are at odds with other aspects of privacy.
225  
1.  Targeting Sensitive Information 
A number of the recently proposed privacy bills are narrowly focused on protecting 
especially sensitive information or limiting information sharing in a particular industry. For 
example, the Financial Information Privacy Protection Act is targeted at information sharing by 
financial institutions.
226 This bill, intended to amend Gramm-Leach-Bliley, stipulates that a 
financial institution may not disclose any “nonpublic personal information to an affiliate or a 
nonaffiliated third party” unless the financial institution first has provided a “clear and 
conspicuous notice” and given the consumer an opportunity to opt-out of the disclosure.
227 For 
especially sensitive data, including financial transactions and personal health information, opt-
in consent would be required. Access on request is also mandated, although the institution 
would be allowed to charge a reasonable fee. In addition to FTC enforcement, the proposal 
would allow states to bring suit against violators, but not if a federal action were pending.
228  
The Freedom From Behavioral Profiling Act of 2000 is also targeted at financial 
institutions by amending Gramm-Leach-Bliley, but it calls for more stringent protection.
229 The 
Act would prohibit financial institutions from disclosing any personal information for the 
purpose of marketing non-financial products to the consumer without the consumer’s explicit 
consent (that is, it would require opt-in). The proposal does not distinguish between affiliates 
and third parties, although the prohibition pertains to non-financial products only. Presumably, 
companies and their affiliates could still use personal information for marketing financial 
products.  
                                                 
225 For example, as discussed below, access rules can affect data security and anti-spam legislation can hinder opt-
in choice mechanisms. Other legislation may not pass Constitutionality tests (limiting unsolicited email could 
also result in constraints on free speech, for instance). 
226 For additional information, see S. 30, 107
th Cong. (2001) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://thomas.loc.gov> (enter 
the bill number to pull up the text of the proposed Acts (i.e., type S. 30 to see the Financial Information Privacy 
Protection Act).) 
227 The bill requires consumer access and the opportunity to prove inaccuracies and make corrections as well. 
228 The bill also stipulates that the FTC may “stay the [state] action.”  
229 For additional information, see S. 536, 107
th Cong. (2001) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://thomas.loc.gov>.  
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Also among the targeted acts are three aimed at preventing dissemination of Social 
Security numbers: the Personal Information Privacy Act of 2001 (H.R. 1478), the Social 
Security Online Privacy Protection Act (H.R. 91), and the Social Security Number Privacy Act 
of 2001 (S. 324).
230 In short, the bills are an attempt to identify Social Security numbers as 
highly personal information that require consumer opt-in before sharing of any kind, either with 
affiliates or third parties.
231 Under the Personal Information Privacy Act, individuals would be 
allowed to bring civil suit against violators. Violators may also face civil monetary penalties of 
$25,000 to $50,000, per violation.  
The Personal Information Privacy Act of 2001 g oes further than the other two Social 
Security number bills by also requiring explicit opt-in before a company could share or sell any 
consumer transaction and experience data. As we discussed earlier, this data is important for 
credit reporting purposes. While none of the above bills mention Internet commerce directly, 
they would all affect Web sites offering financial and health care services. 
2.  Identifying Offensive Materials and Preventing Spam 
Another area that has been targeted is email “spam,” and in particular, pornography-
related spam. A 2001 law called Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and 
Marketing Act (or CAN SPAM for short)
232 calls for penalties for intentionally misleading or 
false email headers (source, destination, and subject fields) or information content. These 
headers can be used to lure recipients into reading mail they otherwise would not have. The law 
also requires that all unsolicited email include a return address (email and postal) so that 
recipients can easily opt-out of future mailings. .
233 Violators could face fines of $10 per 
violation up to a maximum of $500,000 and imprisonment of up to one year.
234 States would be 
                                                 
230 For additional information, see H.R. 1478, H.R. 91, and S. 324, respectively, 107
th Cong. (2001) (visited Sep. 4, 
2001) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. 
231 As the text for H.R. 1478 reads, “No person may buy, sell, offer for sale, take or give in exchange, or pledge or 
give in pledge any information for the purpose, in whole or in part, of conveying by means of such information 
any individual's social security account number, or any derivative of such number, without the written consent 
of such individual” (id.). It is unclear whether the proposed laws would have a significant affect on the number 
of identity thefts, given that the typical theft involves a stolen wallet or purse rather than unauthorized access to 
an online database. 
232 For additional information, see S. 630, 107
th Cong. (2001) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. 
233 The Act would exempt email to consumers who have “implied consent” by purchasing products or requesting 
information from the commercial entity within the last five years. 
234 The fine structure is defined as up to $10 per violation (to be determined by the court) multiplied by the number 
of violations or a flat fee of $500,000.  
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allowed to bring civil actions on behalf of residents; Internet Service Providers also would be 
allowed to bring civil suits. 
The Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2001 has similar provisions, but 
would allow Internet Service Providers to negotiate separate rules for preventing unsolicited 
email to its subscribers––regardless of individual subscriber wishes.
235 The Act would also 
allow individuals, ISPs, and states to sue “spammers.”
236 Damages awarded could be as much 
as $500 per violation with a maximum fine of $50,000.
237 Finally, the FTC would be required 
to submit a report on the effectiveness and enforcement of the Act no later than 18 months after 
its enactment. Along similar lines as the other two unsolicited email bills, the Anti-Spamming 
Act of 2001 would outlaw misleading header and routing information.
238 In addition, however, 
it would prohibit the sale of “spamware”–– programs that assist in the sending of anonymous 
email. 
3.  Prohibiting Consumer Profiling 
The Electronic Privacy Protection Act is aimed primarily at surreptitious information 
collection.
239 The proposal would make it illegal for “any person to knowingly make, import, 
export, distribute, sell, offer for sale, install, or use an information collection device” without 
first providing the target with notice and obtaining his or her consent. That is, all information 
collection hardware or software, such as programs that are capable of transmitting data about 
the end user’s computer or Internet service, would be covered by an opt-in default.
240 Violators 
would face fines of $500 to $1500, double if the violation involved a minor. 
The Spyware  Control and Privacy Protection Act of 2001 has a similar focus on 
information collection software, but would go much further in its protection.
241 In addition to 
mandating notice and opt-in consent, the Spyware bill would also require the company to list 
all of the information subject to collection, as well as the name and address of all recipients of 
                                                 
235 For additional information, see H.R. 718, 107
th Cong. (2001) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. 
236 The Act specifically prohibits class action suits. 
237 The fine structure is more complicated in this bill than in the CAN SPAM Act of 2001. Different rules apply to 
individuals, ISPs, and states. 
238 For additional information, see H.R. 1017, 107
th Cong. (2001) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. 
239 For additional information, see H.R. 112, 107
th Cong. (2001) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. 
240 The Act specifically exempts the placement of cookies. 
241 For additional information, see S. 197, 107
th Cong. (2001) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. This 
act also exempts the placement of cookies.  
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the information. In addition, consumers would be granted access to all of the collected data and 
allowed the opportunity to correct or amend the data. Violators of the Spyware bill could face 
private law suits. 
4.  Providing Comprehensive Information Privacy Protection 
In addition to the issue-specific Acts discussed above, several broader bills were 
recently introduced that would cover Internet privacy in general. For example, the Consumer 
Internet Privacy Enhancement Act would cover all commercial Web site operators.
242 This 
proposal would require the operators to provide notice of information collection policies, 
including what types of information may be collected and a description of the categories of 
likely recipients of the information. In addition, visitors to the site must be provided with an 
opportunity to opt-out of having their information shared. Violators could face fines from 
$22,000 to $500,000.
243 State Attorneys General would also be allowed to bring civil action. 
The Online Privacy Protection Act of 2001 would provide even broader information 
privacy protection. It proposes extending the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 
to all individuals 13 years and older.
244 The general guidelines call for clear and conspicuous 
notice, a choice mechanism (either opt-in or opt-out), and “reasonable” access.
245 The bill 
would leave the implementation of the Act to the FTC, meaning that the Commission would 
define the final rules and regulations. The FTC would also handle enforcement, but states 
would be allowed to bring civil suits. 
The Consumer Online Privacy and Disclosure Act would also grant broad authority to 
the FTC.
246 In addition to mandating notice, an easy-to-use online opt-out mechanism, and 
access to collected data, this bill would prohibit the use of persistent cookies without explicit 
opt-in consent. The proposal goes further than the other omnibus bills in terms of enforcement. 
In addition to enforcement by the FTC and state civil action, the bill would allow private law 
suits. 
                                                 
242 For additional information, see H.R. 237, 107
th Cong. (2001) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. 
243 In addition, violations would be covered by the FTC Act’s “unfair and deceptive” acts section. Web site 
operators adhering to approved self-regulation measures could be granted “safe harbor” by the FTC. 
244 For additional information, see H.R. 89, 107
th Cong. (2001) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. 
245 Note that the regulations would allow Web site operators following the provisions of the Act to terminate 
service to individuals who refuse to permit the operator's further use or maintenance in retrievable form, or 
future collection, of personal information.  
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B.  Quantifying and Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Proposed Legislation 
Given the number of information privacy laws proposed, and the far-reaching 
implications on Internet commerce that some of these proposals seem to entail, one might 
expect a rich body of cost-benefit analysis. The surprising, and dismaying, reality is that not 
much in the way of quantification exists.
247 Throughout this paper we have discussed in a 
general way (adding a few specific examples) the potential costs and benefits associated with 
legislating information privacy. Here we focus on that issue, providing as much concrete 
evidence as we can assemble regarding the potential costs and benefits of key aspects of 
proposed legislation.  
Because many of the potential costs and benefits associated with proposed legislation 
are common across several bills, we organize our discussion here around the Fair Information 
principles defined earlier,
248 with an additional section at the end addressing possible 
unintended consequences that the proposals may create. In a few instances, the costs associated 
with already enacted laws are illustrative of the potential costs for proposed legislation. Thus, 
we revisit some of the bills discussed above, providing new information on quantifiable costs 
and benefits. 
1.  Notice 
Arguably the first step an individual can take in protecting information privacy is to 
carefully read each visited Web site’s privacy policy. If the policy does n ot pass muster, 
consumers may abandon the site before any harm is done.
249 It is not surprising then that all of 
the above legislative proposals include rules regarding notification.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
246 For additional information, see H.R. 347, 107
th Cong. (2001) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. 
247 Kenneth Laudon laments, “The FIRE (Finance, Insurance, Real-Estate) industry is one of the largest generators 
and users of personal information, accounting for 1.1 trillion dollars in GDP, over 500,000 establishments and 
seven million employees. Even here, there is no accounting of the dollar amount of personal information trade” 
(Laudon, supra note 52, at “The Economics of Existing Personal Information Markets”). 
248 Because security, one of the Fair Information principles, interacts so closely with other principles, like access, 
we do not address security separately. Instead, we discuss how online data security would be affected by choice 
and access rules. 
249 It is not clear whether consumers are actually reading the privacy policies that Web sites post. For example, the 
former Chief Privacy Officer of  Excite@Home told a Federal Trade Commission workshop that, “on the day 
after that company was featured in a 60 Minutes segment about Internet privacy, only 100 out of 20 million 
unique visitors accessed that company’s privacy pages.” Reading the information privacy policy is arguably the 
first step a consumer should take in protecting her privacy. See FED. TRADE COMMISSION, WORKSHOP ON “THE 
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The Federal Trade Commission and commercial research organizations have monitored 
Web sites’ progress in voluntarily providing notice of privacy policies to customers. In 1998, 
the FTC found that only 14 percent of 1,400 randomly sampled commercial Web sites provided 
any kind of notice about its information practices.
250 By February 2000, a commercially 
sponsored survey of 30,000 Web sites found that the number posting privacy policies had 
almost doubled, to around 23 percent.
251 This study found that among the top 1,000 Web sites 
(defined by the number of unique visitors to the site), 84 percent had a privacy notice of some 
sort.
252 By the summer of 2000, the FTC found further improvement in voluntary privacy 
policy notification.
253 In the 2000 update of the 1998 study the FTC reported, “The 2000 
Survey results show that there has been continued improvement in the percent of websites that 
post at least one privacy disclosure (88% in the Random Sample and 100% in the Most Popular 
Group).”
254  
Given that over 80 percent of U.S. Web sites are already providing a privacy policy 
notice, legislation requiring it seems unnecessary at this point.
255 Also, there is some danger in 
codifying practices in law because it could prevent later innovations that industry would adopt 
as a matter of course, just as it has adopted Web site privacy policy notification. 
Another less obvious aspect of notification is the requirement regarding valid header 
information, spam identifiers, and prohibitions on anonymous routing information, all of which 
could be interpreted as notice requirements. That is, under the anti-spam proposals companies 
sending unsolicited mail would have to notify receivers that the email is, in fact, unsolicited 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
INFORMATION MARKETPLACE: MERGING AND EXCHANGING CONSUMER DATA” (Mar. 13, 2001) (comments of 
Ted Wham) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/infomktplace/transcript.htm>.  
250 Statistics as of March 1998.  See FED. TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (Jun. 
1998). 
251 E NONYMOUS.COM, INTERNET PRIVACY: A SUMMARY OF PRIVACY RATINGS RESEARCH BY E NONYMOUS.COM 
(Apr. 2000) (visited Sep. 4, 2001) < http://www.enonymous.com/study1.doc>. Note that this statistic (23 
percent) does not include sites that do not collect any PII. Moreover, the 30,000 sites in the survey included non-
commercial sites, like dot-org, dot-net, dot-edu, and dot-gov. The dot-org, dot-net, and dot-edu sites all had 
smaller percentages of privacy policy notification. Among the dot-coms, around 25 percent had some kind of 
policy posted. 
252 According to a January 2000 review of websites by enonymous.com. See id. 
253 FED. TRADE COMMISSION (2000), supra note 16. 
254 The Random Sample studied 335 websites; the Most Popular Group studied 91 of the 100 busiest sites 
(measured by number of unique visitors to the site). See id. 
255 The 2000 FTC survey found 88 percent in the Random Sample and 100 percent in the Most Popular Group 
posted privacy notices. See id. at app. C, table 2a.    
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and clearly state who is sending it.
256 Legislative proposals attempting to control spam are 
understandable given the ubiquity of unsolicited email. Many Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
like the idea of regulating spam because “large amounts of spam can hang up smaller networks 
that simply can’t absorb the traffic.”
257 America Online (certainly not a small network) has 
estimated that spam accounts for up to a third of all of its traffic.
258 
The proposed unsolicited email notification rules could make it easier for consumers to 
avoid unsolicited email. Two of the anti-spam bills state that part of the justification for federal 
action in this area is the lack of current consumer protection: “recipients…are unable to avoid 
the receipt of such mail through reasonable means…”
259 This justification, however, ignores 
the technological tools available to consumers, like the filtering software discussed above. 
Moreover, certain aspects of the anti-spam acts have significant free speech implications. It 
would be difficult to limit regulation to genuine spam.
260 Defining spam precisely is a difficult 
task, and one that the worst offenders will work hard to circumvent (assuming the sellers do not 
simply locate outside of the U.S. to avoid the laws altogether).
261 As a result, legitimate 
anonymous speech would be hurt by these rules.  
Drawing Internet Service Providers into the mix, as the Unsolicited Commercial 
Electronic Mail Act of 2001 would do, will not solve this problem. Swire and Litan note that, 
“…it is far from clear that they [ISPs] have any effective ways to screen out “bad” content 
while permitting “good” content. The poison set for mice may also kill off our favorite pets.  
                                                 
256 Keep in mind that spam “is just one form of marketing and is arguably less invasive than door-to-door selling 
or telemarketing”  (CREWS, JR., supra note 212, at 3). Neither telemarketing nor door-to-door selling is against 
law. A key difference does remain, however: traditional telemarketing and door-to-door selling campaigns are 
considerably more expensive for companies to conduct than spam. The relatively high cost of making phone 
calls means marketers would rather target their spending on receptive consumers. Spam, which can cost a 
fraction of telemarketing, does not face the same monetary constraints. See Jeffrey Benner,  Antispam Laws: 




259 This language appears in both the CAN SPAM Act of 2001 and the Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail 
Act. 
260 Id. at 9. 
261 The CAN SPAM Act of 2001 is likely to fall into this category. While its rules do not prevent unsolicited 
email, and thus would probably not threaten legitimate marketing email, it is doubtful that they would have any 
affect on true spam offenders. Those sellers relying on spam who do not want to provide notice or an opt-out 
opportunity can easily locate outside of the U.S. to avoid regulation.  
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And, even as the pets die off, new mice might emerge that are resistant to the poison.”
262 If 
ISPs are more concerned about their liability in letting spam reach subscribers than about 
individual subscriber preferences––a possibility given the fines some proposed laws attach to 
violations and the fact that some bills would allow individuals to file suit––they will err on the 
side of too much filtering.  
Limitations on spam can also complicate other aspects of the Fair Information 
principles, like choice. If spam legislation and opt-in sharing rules were both enacted, it would 
be difficult for companies to obtain consumer consent for legitimate marketing. Asking for 
consent in the first place would require unsolicited email. But if exceptions were made for this 
type of unsolicited contact, that would surely open the door for abuse by disingenuous 
spammers. 
Another factor of notice is the cost associated with posting a privacy policy. On its face, 
notice appears to be a relatively inexpensive task. While drafting the policy can be costly 
because it may require specialized legal assistance, these costs are one-time only, not ongoing. 
Recent experience, however, with the implementation of Gramm-Leach-Bliley rules in the 
financial industry indicates that even notice can be costly. The printing costs alone for all of 
privacy policy notifications that Gramm-Leach-Bliley requires is already in the range of $2 
billion to $5 billion.
263 It is too early to tell how high other compliance costs will be, but these 
costs are likely to include consulting from lawyers specializing in privacy, part-time employee 
task forces, full-time information technology employees, and the addition of a Chief Privacy 
Officer.
264 As part of compliance, financial institutions have been required to evaluate contracts 
with all of their partners and vendors in order to determine whether their privacy policies were 
consistent with the institution’s own policies––a process that entailed the review of thousands 
of contracts for some banks.
265 One bank likened its efforts to comply with GLB to its efforts to 
prepare for potential millennial-computer problems: “The complexity was the same as the Y2K 
                                                 
262 SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 54, at 203. 
263 CATE (2000), supra note 20, at 53. 
264 These are all actions that FleetBoston Financial Corporation felt it must take in order to comply with GLB. See 
Colkin, supra note 191. 
265 FleetBoston Financial Corporation reviewed the policies for thousands of its partners. Their credit card 
company alone had 700 contracts for outside service that all needed review. See id.  
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bug, only we didn’t have as much time to prepare, and we weren’t able to pinpoint where there 
would be problems.”
266 
2.  Choice  
Unlike the high rates of voluntary compliance with privacy policy notification, fewer 
U.S. commercial Web sites currently offer visitors a means to prevent the commercial use of 
their personal information. In its 2000 Survey, the FTC found that “only 41% of the sites in the 
Random Sample and 60% of the sites in the Most Popular Group meet the basic Notice and 
Choice standards.”
267 Very few Web site operators provide opt-out at the time they collect the 
information, in addition to a general location like in the privacy policy notice: a 2000 survey 
found that about 6 percent of the Web sites surveyed provide a consent mechanism at the point 
of information collection.
268 Thus, among the same commercial Web sites that post a privacy 
policy notice, the majority fails to provide consumers with an easy-to-use choice mechanism 
when it comes to sharing their personal information.
269  
Why do fewer Web sites offer an opt-out mechanism than post privacy notices? The 
issues surrounding choice are much more complicated and controversial than those surrounding 
notice. As discussed at the beginning of the paper, the matter is not simply the distinction 
between opt-in and opt-out, but could be a continuum of choices for different types of personal 
information and different types of commercial use. Choice policies are also likely to be more 
difficult to implement than notice, which simply requires posting a policy on a Web site. 
Rather than constructing overarching share/no-share rules, Varian argues that choice 
mechanisms could function as a primitive form of contract. He suggests “A more interesting 
contract might be something like: ‘Check here if you would like your name distributed to other 
parties who will provide you with information about computer peripherals until 12/31/98. After 
that, name and address will be destroyed. In exchange you will be paid $5.00 for each list to 
whom your name and address is distributed.’”
270  
                                                 
266 Id. 
267 FED. TRADE COMMISSION (2000), supra note 16. 
268 See ENONYMOUS.COM, supra note 251. 
269 Burying the opt-out mechanism in the Web site’s privacy policy notice rather than placing it at the point of 
information collection makes it difficult for consumers to opt-out. See SCHWARTZ & BRUENING, supra note 18. 
270 Varian (1997), supra note 52.  
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The problem with specific contracts of the type Varian suggests is that they could 
significantly reduce the economic gains from trading information. If federal rules limit 
information sharing for all individuals, regardless of their preferences, by mandating time limits 
and specific secondary use consents, then the benefits that society derives from information 
sharing in the form of law enforcement use, product safety recalls, credit card theft reduction, 
and loan approval would be seriously hindered. 
Forcing a generic opt-in rule for all marketing uses (internal and third party) would also 
carry a high price tag. U.S. West is one of the few U.S. companies to actually test an opt-in 
system, albeit using non-Internet methods.
271 The company determined that it required an 
average of 4.8 telephone calls to each customer to reach an adult who  could consent to 
information sharing.
272 In one-third of the households, the company never reached the 
customer, despite numerous attempts. In all, the company spent almost $30 per customer 
contacted trying to establish opt-in consent for data to be used in marketing. The final rate of 
consent fell short of 30 percent of those contacted.  
In addition, those organizations offering customers opt-out have had relatively few 
participants.
273 For example, the Direct Marketing Association offers a free, centralized opt-out 
service for consumers that stops the use of personal information by all of DMA’s member 
companies.
274 The association reports, however, that over the past decade fewer than 3 percent 
of U.S. adults have availed themselves of the opportunity to opt-out.
275 In contrast the 
association also reports “…more than two-thirds of U.S. consumers––132 million adults––took 
advantage of direct marketing opportunities in 1998, accounting for more than $1.3 trillion in 
sales of goods and services.”
276 
                                                 
271 CATE & STATEN (2001), supra note 68.  
272 Brief for Petitioner and Intervenors at 15-16, U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10
th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-
9518). 
273 Cate argues that “privacy in many ways is like any other good: those that value it should be willing to sacrifice 
other goods (time, effort, and energy among them) in order to obtain it. The apparent unwillingness of many 
people desiring more privacy to bear the cost of that privacy … undercut their claims of valuing such additional 
protection” (CATE (1997), supra note 4). 
274 DMA has over 4,700 member organizations, including consumer marketers, business-to-business marketers, 
and suppliers. See Direct Marketing Association, Who Is the Direct Marketing Association (visited Sep. 4, 2001) 
<http://www.the-dma.org/aboutdma/whatisthedma.shtml#who>. 
275 CATE & STATEN (2001), supra note 68.  
276 Id.  
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The lack of participation in marketing opt-outs could be attributed to a lack of education 
on how to protect privacy. Consumers cannot opt-out of an information-sharing program if they 
do not know the opt-out opportunity exists.
277 Nonetheless, the fact that millions of Americans 
chose to act on a direct marketing solicitation indicates that many people do perceive a benefit 
from unsolicited contact. As long as significant numbers of people reply to direct marketing 
campaigns, consumers can expect to receive significant amounts of targeted mail online and 
offline.  
In the absence of transaction costs, opt-in and opt-out rules define the distribution of 
resources, but not the extent of privacy protection.
278 That is, regardless of who is granted the 
initial “right” to information (the consumers the information describes or the commercial 
companies that collect the information), the entity valuing the information the most will end up 
with the final, negotiated “right.”
279 The U.S. West experience, however, suggests considerable 
transaction costs. In this scenario, an opt-in system resulted in more customer contact and 
higher costs for the company than with opt-out. While the cost of obtaining consumer consent 
would be much lower on the Internet, the end result could easily be more unsolicited email to 
consumers. 
As another example of the costs associated with opt-in, consider the consequences of 
the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, which requires explicit opt-in approval for the 
disclosure and resale of personal information contained in records maintained by state 
DMVs.
280 Historically, credit agencies relied on DMV records to verify current address and 
other personal information, but due to the administrative costs associated with opt-in, states 
have stopped selling this information altogether.
281 While this certainly limited potential misuse 
                                                 
277 Interviews conducted by the American Banker revealed that financial customers had never heard of the hotline 
service (1-888-5OPT-OUT) that “can virtually end the mailing of pre-approved credit card offers” by 
eliminating the sale of personal information by credit reporting agencies. See Lee, supra note 194. 
278 Absent any negotiation costs and assuming there are no income effects, the initial allocation of legal rights does 
not matter from an efficiency perspective so long as they can be exchanged in a perfectly competitive market.  
See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6-8 (1980). 
279 If the right is given to individuals, but commercial companies value the information more, then they will pay 
for the right to collect it. If, on the other hand, commercial companies start with the right to collect information, 
but individuals value privacy more, then they will pay companies to forgo their information. Under the 
restrictive assumptions noted above, the final allocation of the information is the same regardless of the initial 
rights. There are, of course, important distributional consequences associated with the initial allocation of rights. 
280 This law restricts governmental disclosure of personal information.  See Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 
1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994). 
281 RUBIN & LENARD, supra note 70, at 33.  
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of the personal data, it also raised the cost of maintaining accurate credit reports. Less accurate 
and more costly reports make it more difficult for consumers to obtain credit and raise the price 
of obtaining credit. 
Despite what economic theory suggests about the equivalence of opt-in and opt-out 
rules for protecting privacy in the absence of any transaction costs, the empirical reality points 
to real differences between the two choice mechanisms. Transaction costs do exist. Moreover, 
consumers may view the two choice mechanisms quite differently, regardless of how choice 
works in theory. A study on this issue found that “simply framing the question as an opt-out 
instead of an opt-in changes privacy preferences.”
282 These authors confirm the Ernst & Young 
finding (discussed earlier) that the definition of the default has a huge influence on how many 
individuals would allow information sharing. In particular, the survey results showed that “The 
opt-in question, where the no-action default is to not participate, produces a participation rate 
(48.2%) half the size of the opt-out question (96.3%), where the no-action default is to 
participate.”
283 Providing further support is the testimony of a witness before the FTC who 
indicated that when a client of his firm set the default as opt-in, only 15 percent of consumers 
chose to provide their data; when it set the default as opt-out, 95 percent chose to provide their 
data.
284 
 Opt-in can lead to less information sharing not because people who genuinely value 
privacy are no longer allowing their personal data to be traded, but rather because companies 
may find it too expensive to administer an opt-in program and because, due to inertia, people 
simply accept the opt-in no-sharing default regardless of their privacy preferences. An opt-in 
rule would therefore be inefficient because it could discourage too many individuals from 
participating. In this case, the total data pool would become less valuable for everyone and 
could lead to higher consumer prices. As a fashion industry consultant estimated, limiting the 
                                                 
282 Steven Bellman, et al., To Opt-In Or To Opt-Out? It Depends On The Question, COMM. OF THE ACM, Nov. 13, 
2000. 
283 Id. 
284 Parry Ponemon, 2 Wireless Web, Data Services and Beyond: Emerging Technologies and Consumer Issues 
232, Comments Made at the FTC Workshop (Dec. 12, 2000) (visited S ep 4. 2001) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/wireless/001212.htm >.    
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use of personal information could increase the costs of online and catalog apparel by as much 
as 3.5 to 11 percent.
285 
Of course, the choice question need not define a default at all. In this case, the consumer 
would have to actively select whether to share or not to share personal information with 
affiliates and third parties before the original transaction could be completed. The Bellman et al 
survey mentioned above found that in this scenario, question framing continued to have a large 
impact on participation rates.
286 Ari Schwartz and Paula Bruening warn, however, that the no-
default approach could lead to fewer transactions: “…individuals do not like to be given too 
many options and may even become confused and cancel transactions when forced to do so.”
287  
As a final caution against comprehensive opt-in rules, consider the evidence presented 
earlier on the low rate of consumers (only 3 percent for the DMA) currently taking advantage 
of opt-out opportunities.
288 This may represent skepticism on the part of consumers, who doubt 
that opting-out will result in any real difference in the unsolicited marketing and advertising 
they receive. But it could also represent what economists refer to as “revealed preference.”
289 In 
other words, actions speak louder than words. It is easy to complain of disappearing privacy on 
the Internet, but if individuals do not act on that concern by seeking opt-out opportunities, they 
have revealed that the effort involved in opting-out exceeds the value they place on privacy for 
that piece of information or that type of information sharing. Supporting the revealed 
preference interpretation of consumer inaction are the statistics on how many people do act on 
unsolicited marketing offers.
290  
Lest we go too far in arguing that consumers do not value privacy, though, consider 
some additional statistics. Over 30 percent of Manhattan residents pay to keep their telephone 
                                                 
285 MICHAEL T URNER, D IRECT MARKETING ASS’N, I NC., T HE I MPACT  OF D ATA R ESTRICTIONS  ON C ONSUMER 
DISTANCE S HOPPING (visited Sep. 4, 2001) < http://the-dma.org/isec/9.pdf>.  Turner notes that online and 
catalog apparel retailers currently face very narrow profit margins. Any costs arising out of limitations on the 
use of personal information would be passed directly on to consumers. Communities underserved by brick-and-
mortar operations, like inner-cities and rural areas, would be hardest hit. 
286 The specific percentages Bellman, et al. report are most likely influenced by their particular survey content. In 
order to test choice mechanisms, they were offering prizes for future survey participation. Thus, their rates of 
participation are not entirely informative on opt-in and opt-out questions for marketing data. The fact that their 
default-based findings support other studies, though, does lend considerable credence. 
287 SCHWARTZ & BRUENING, supra note 18, at 5. 
288 For example, only 3 percent opt-out of the Direct Marketing Association’s information sharing. See CATE  & 
STATEN (2001), supra note 68, at 9.  
289 For a technical definition, see VARIAN (1992), supra note 64, at 132. 
290 CATE & STATEN (2001), supra note 68.   
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numbers unlisted in the public telephone books; over 50 percent of Californians pay for that 
service.
291 The Lotus “Households” database issue discussed earlier provides another example 
of significant consumer action––over 30,000 people contacted Lotus requesting to be removed 
from the database.
292 In these instances, the revealed preference of a great many individuals is 
for privacy. Taken together, the evidence argues for selective, but easy-to-use choice 
mechanisms. Highly sensitive information could warrant carefully crafted opt-in rules. For 
most situations, however, opt-out would suffice, as long as the opt-out opportunity was placed 
at the point of information collection and not buried within the Web site’s privacy notice.
293  
Using a “common-sense” benefit-cost evaluation, the bills calling for extra protection of 
Social Security numbers merit careful review. Because protecting Social Security numbers is a 
key element in preventing identity theft, as well as limiting all sorts of other illegitimate 
financial and health information disclosure, arguing that these data deserve special opt-in status 
is not a difficult task. Of course, increasing the protection of Social Security numbers would 
come at a price to both businesses and consumers. For example, some financial institutions and 
other businesses would need to devise new methods for verifying customer identity.
294 As a 
result, consumers would likely need to keep track of multiple authorization codes, one for each 
of the companies that they do business with. Compared to the cost of identity theft and credit 
card fraud, though, these inconveniences seem minor.  
Finally, it is quite possible that companies may adopt opt-in rules voluntarily for some 
types of information collection and sharing. Permission-based emailing is evidently on the 
rise.
295 Because response rates are higher with opt-in consumers, data traders are able to charge 
                                                 
291 Noam, supra note 52, at “What is Privacy?”  
292 CATE (1997), supra note 4, at 104. 
293 Over 50 percent of U.S. Web sites already provide some sort of opportunity to opt-out of information sharing, 
but only around 6 percent provide that opportunity at the point of information collection. See ENONYMOUS.COM, 
supra note 251. 
294 Note that the Social Security Number Privacy Act of 2001 (S. 324) would not prevent affiliates from sharing 
Social Security numbers and thus would not prevent financial institutions from using the numbers for customer 
authorization. Instead the bill would define Social Security numbers as “nonpublic personal information,” 
subject to the protection of Gramm-Leach-Bliley. The Personal Information Privacy Act of 2001 (H.R. 1478, 
however, expressly prohibits institutions and individuals from using Social Security numbers “for the purposes 
of identification” without opt-in consent.   
295 YesMail.com, About Permission e-mail (visited Sep. 4, 2001) <http://www.yesmail.com/learn/>.  
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higher prices for customer lists created with opt-in choice mechanisms.
296 This creates an 
incentive for companies to willingly move to opt-in for certain types of information sharing. 
3.  Access 
Access is yet another complicated area of privacy protection with unintended 
consequences. While allowing individuals to correct false personal information is clearly a 
worthy goal, consider some potential abuses. Should consumers b e allowed to delete 
information that companies have collected, even if it is not false? If so, this could devalue all 
information. Individuals with bad credit histories could cleanse their records of unpleasant 
facts; credit agencies would no longer know w hether they had accurate or complete 
information.
297 As a result, individuals with good credit could not be easily distinguished from 
those with bad credit, and all consumers would pay in terms of less credit and higher prices.  
Because some commercial institutions base important decisions, like credit approval, on 
personal data, consumers should be granted access to sensitive and important information (such 
as credit related data, financial data, health records, and the like). The abuse scenario discussed 
above suggests that any changes should be limited to correcting errors only. In this case, some 
sort of error verification mechanism could be needed.  
For information that is collected for marketing purposes only, however, it is difficult to 
see the value to consumers of correcting personal data. Would a consumer really care whether 
or not an unsolicited email arrived with her name misspelled, for instance? Even if annoying, 
this kind of error is unlikely to justify the time and hassle required for consumers to correct the 
information. Access to marketing information therefore seems to provide little benefit for 
consumers. 
 Putting aside the decision of what to provide access for, granting access to personal 
data in an online setting is clearly easier for consumers and cheaper for companies. There is 
considerable tension, however, between ease of access for a consumer and abusive access by an 
unauthorized individual.
298 A database that is accessible only through the company is relatively 
more secure. The more people allowed access to a database with sensitive information, the 
                                                 
296 RUBIN & LENARD, supra note 70, at 15.   
297 Wallison, supra note 3, at A23. 
298 As noted in the Advisory Committee Report to the FTC, “…privacy is lost if a security failure results in access 
being granted to the wrong person” (FED. TRADE COMMISSION (2000), supra note 16, at 15).   
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more that database is prone to abuse. Making personal information databases reasonably secure 
is bound to be more difficult and expensive if access is granted online. Requiring complicated 
identification mechanisms could lead to more disclosure: consumers wanting to access and 
change their information would need to reveal credit card numbers, Social Security numbers, or 
other personal data in order to authenticate their identity.  
The problem with making access available offline, though, is that in addition to raising 
the cost to the consumer of viewing and correcting her information, the cost is much higher for 
the company as well. For example, The British Bankers’ Association calculated the cost to a 
single institution providing one customer with “a simple and straight forward report” under the 
EU Directive was “in excess of £150,” or about USD 213.
299 
The access provision in one of the proposed bills, in particular, would likely lead to 
high costs for Web sites. The Spyware Control and Privacy Protection Act of 2001 would have 
sweeping implications for access. In particular, the bill requires access to the name and address 
of all companies receiving personal information. Given the existence of a  secondary data 
market, this last provision would be extremely costly and difficult to administer. Web sites 
would need to track data that they currently have no need for, like full information on each 
recipient of personal data, the exact data that was shared, and consumers’ preferences at the 
time.  
In an earlier study, Robert Hahn conducted a survey estimating the cost to commercial 
Web sites of an access rule like the one described in the Spyware bill.
300 He assumed that Web 
sites collecting personal information already posted a privacy notice and offered opt-out from 
third party information sharing. If access provisions such as those in the Spyware bill were 
passed, the sites would need to add an online access mechanism that tracked all personal 
information collected over time, along with each individual’s opt-out preferences at the time, 
and the name and address of any third party the information was sold to. While Hahn assumed 
that the Web sites were already offering notice, opt-out choice, and simple access, he assumed 
they had not implemented any of the information tracking that the bill’s passing would require. 
The software needed to perform these tracking and storage functions was assumed to be out-
                                                 
299 CATE (2000), supra note 20, at 45. 
300 Robert Hahn, An Assessment of the Costs of Proposed Online Privacy Legislation (May 7, 2001) (unpublished 
manuscript) (visited Sep. 21, 2001) <http://www.actonline.org/pubs/HahnStudy.pdf> at 16-23.  
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sourced to consultants. He then surveyed information  technology consultants, who estimated 
that custom access-tracking software would cost, on average, $100,000 per Web site.
301 In 
terms of industry level costs, detailed access rules like the ones proposed in the Spyware bill 
could imply compliance costs in the range of $9 billion to $36 billion.
302 
Costs of this magnitude may not rule out federal regulation of information privacy, but 
they should give pause to regulators. Before passing any highly restrictive rules, such as the 
access rules detailed in the Spyware bill, regulators must carefully weigh the potential benefits 
to consumers against the likely costs to companies and consumers. 
4.  Enforcement 
Enforcement is a key element of any successful regulation, whether government led or 
industry led. A privacy policy notice is not much help if the Web site is free to violate its policy 
whenever it chooses. Consumers must have recourse and companies must face consequences 
when addressing perceived privacy violations. 
That said, enforcement needs to be exercised judiciously. High fines and the right to 
private action could lead to excessive litigation. For example, the Unsolicited Commercial 
Electronic Mail Act of 2001 was characterized as a “trial lawyer’s relief act” by the president of 
                                                 
301 Some critics of the study argued that assuming all Web sites would require a custom solution is an 
exaggeration. We were unable to find any statistics on the percentage of commercial Web sites that currently 
collect personal information and that also rely on custom software. A European study, however, estimates that 
acquisition costs represent only around 20 percent of the total cost of ownership for new software (custom or 
otherwise). Thus 80 percent of the costs are due to factors like deployment, data migration, training, support, 
and interoperability. See Patrice-Emmanuel Schmitz, Study into the Use of Open Source Software in the Public 
Sector, Part 3: The Open Source Market Structure (Jun. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, Interchange of Data 
between Administrations (IDA)) at 16. Thus, even if a firm were able to purchase an off-the-shelf software 
solution (given that such a solutions were available, which would take time), the package would still need to be 
integrated into the Web site’s existing software code. In the Hahn survey, the  consultants broke down the 
different aspects of the custom software solution, and one of the largest components was integration. It is 
therefore not clear that moving to shrink-wrap access-tracking software would reduce the above cost estimate 
dramatically. For details of the survey and survey responses, see id. at app. B. 
302 Hahn calculated these figures by multiplying the $100,000 software cost by the estimated number of 
commercially viable U.S.-based Web sites. An eCommerce study estimates that as of February 2001 there were 
3.7 million such sites in the U.S. See EMARKETER, THE ECOMMERCE: B2B REPORT (Feb. 2001) (visited Sep. 4, 
2001) < http://www.emarketer.com/ereports/ecommerce_b2b/welcome.html> (description only available). Of 
these, the vast majority of sites is run by small companies with fewer than 100 employees. The consultants who 
estimated software costs did not assume any given employee size for the Web sites, but instead assumed that the 
Web sites had around 100,000 registered subscribers. There is no reason to assume any relationship between a 
company’s employee size and its customer base. Moreover, several consultants indicated that the software cost 
estimates were not especially sensitive to changes in the number of registered subscribers as many of the costs 
of software development were fixed rather than variable.   
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the Securities Industry Association.
303 The high fines specified in several of the proposals (for 
example, $500 per violation up to a $50,000 maximum for the Unsolicited Electronic Mail Act 
and $22,000 to $500,000 per violation for the Consumer Privacy Enhancement Act) exceed the 
actual harm that could be done by typical privacy violations. Fees of this nature “would be off-
putting to many small businesses thinking of trying to conduct email marketing.”
304 Fines 
should be set with deterrence and not litigation jackpots in mind.
305 Consider that “If people are 
going to get $500 for every unwanted email, spam hunting could be much more lucrative than a 
job.”
306 
Another factor to consider is who has the right to sue. The proposed laws offer several 
different options, including the FTC, state Attorney Generals and individuals. We just 
discussed the dangerous combination of excessive fines and individual lawsuits in the above 
paragraph. If states are allowed the authority to bring suit, more rent seeking behavior is likely. 
States could free-ride on cases brought by the federal government,
307 as well as bring their own 
cases.
308 Allowing the FTC to stay state actions, as the Financial Information Privacy Act 
would do, could help to alleviate this problem. 
5.  Unintended Consequences 
One final potential cost to information privacy legislation is that it may have unforeseen 
consequences. For example, Swire notes that legislation could lead to less self-regulation as 
companies grow lax in policing themselves and rely instead on complying with the letter of the 
law instead of the spirit of privacy protection.
309 Due to the pace of technological advances for 
Internet commerce, the lack of motivation for self-regulation that takes advantage of the newest 
technologies is a serious concern.  
We also discussed an unintended effect of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA) earlier: the rules have led to decreased interactive services on Web sites for children. 
                                                 
303 CREWS, JR., supra note 212, at 11. 
304 Id. at 12. 
305 Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 2, 169-271 (1968). 
306 CREWS, JR., supra note 212, at 13. 
307 In discussing free riding within an antitrust regulation context, Posner refers to this kind of rent seeking as the 
“cluster bomb” effect. Richard Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (2001). 
308 KIP V ISCUSI, THE REGULATION-LITIGATION INTERACTION 01-13 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies Working Paper 01-13, October 2001) (visited October 24, 2001) 
<http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/working/working_01_13.pdf>.   
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When considering the protection of at-risk groups like children, reduced services may be a 
price society is willing to pay. Legislation for less critical populations and less sensitive 
personal data should tread more carefully. Health records are typically considered sensitive 
data, but even here legislators should be cautious. Some worry that the rules set by HIPAA will 
reduce the data available for medical research. 
Another inadvertent effect of legislation is the artificial distinction between personal 
information collected online as compared to that collected offline. While there are genuine 
differences due to the medium,
310 discrepancies between offline and online privacy legislation 
could lead to problems for companies with business in both worlds. Consider, for example, a 
clothing retailer with brick-and-mortar stores, catalogs, and a Web site. This retailer collects 
marketing information from its customers at all three points of sale, as well as from information 
brokers.
311 Instead of creating a uniform database from all sources for use in its market research 
and marketing efforts, however, the retailer would have to keep personal information collected 
online separate. Otherwise, the retailer could not comply, or prove compliance, with the 
provisions in the proposed laws that differ from previously enacted offline laws (such as junk 
mail rules or access tracking requirements). In other words, the company would be forced 
either to treat the same kinds of information in very different ways, based solely on how that 
information was collected, or to treat all information in the most restrictive and costly way to 
ensure compliance.
312 One consequence of different treatment, then, would be increased 
administrative costs for firms, and as a result, increased prices for consumers. Another 
consequence could be that online-only companies are placed at a competitive disadvantage 
relative to offline companies.
313 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
309 Swire, supra note 97, at “Self-Regulation as an Alternative to Threatened Government Regulation.” 
310 Kang, supra note 5, at 1268. 
311 As described in the FTC Advisory Committee report, “A business may purchase information about its existing 
customers from another business or it can purchase a list containing information about individuals it would like 
to attract as customers, such as a mailing list. Similarly, a business may purchase data that is used to enhance the 
information that it has about its own customers” (FED. TRADE COMMISSION (2000), supra note 16, at 5). 
312 Regarding the discrepancies between online and offline privacy regulation, the FTC May 2000 study states 
“The Commission’s review of privacy has mainly focused on online issues because the Commission believes 
privacy is a critical component in the development of electronic commerce. However, the FTC Act and most 
other statutes enforced by the Commission apply equally in the offline and online worlds” (id. at ftnt 23).  
313 FTC Commissioner Leary makes this point as well. See Jeffery, supra note 4, at 13.  
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Table 4 consolidates the many examples we have discussed where tangible numbers can 
be estimated. It highlights both the costs of certain aspects of protecting privacy and the 
potential benefits from sharing information freely. To be truly balanced, the table should also 
include numbers estimating the potential benefit to consumers from protecting their 
information privacy. Unfortunately, we were unable to find any such figures, most likely 
because putting real numbers to heterogeneous individuals’ valuations for privacy is a difficult 
task. Nonetheless, informing consumers and lawmakers about the costs that privacy regulation 
can impose allows these individuals to make their own assessment of the regulations and 
legislation with the best available information.  
 
V.  Conclusion 
The debate over regulating online privacy is still in its infancy. There is significant 
disagreement about the appropriate set of policies. This paper has attempted to provide a 
framework for understanding the debate. We suggested that there are four camps that advocate 
different approaches to the problem of protecting on-line privacy. The anti-surveillance camp 
supported a policy requiring Web sites to obtain explicit consumer consent (opt-in) before using 
any information obtained from individuals who visit a particular site. The tradable rights camp 
argued for giving rights in certain information to individuals and allowing them to trade it with 
commercial data collectors. The free-flow-of-information camp argued that it was not efficient 
to have an opt-in policy, but that more information used by marketers was likely to benefit 
consumers through targeting of advertising. Finally, the utilitarian camp argued for analyzing 
online privacy issues and proposals on a case-by-case basis using cost-benefit analysis. 
As the reader may have surmised, we are in the utilitarian camp. We think that issues of 
privacy and the Internet should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. At the same time, we 
recognize the limitations of the utilitarian approach and, in particular, cost-benefit analysis.  
However, one advantage of cost-benefit analysis is that it provides a transparent framework for 
helping to develop and assess different policies for protecting online privacy. 
After reviewing these camps, we provided a careful analysis of existing and proposed 
legislation. This analysis pointed out some of the difficulties in designing useful laws. These 
included unintended consequences, potential economic impacts, and constitutionality.    
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Based on this review, we offer the following conclusions related to the development of 
policy. 
1.  The government should carefully consider the economic ramifications of its 
policies before regulating online privacy because the stakes are high. The 
Internet is evolving very rapidly.
314  So, too, are the responses by businesses to 
concerns about privacy. While the unregulated market is far from perfect, 
history teaches us that government intervention in technologically dynamic 
markets can frequently lead to inefficient results and unintended consequences.  
2.  The government should fund research that evaluates the effectiveness of existing 
privacy legislation. There is already a significant amount of legislation aimed at 
protecting various aspects of online privacy. We know surprisingly little about 
the impacts of this legislation in terms of its efficacy in protecting privacy, the 
costs it imposes on consumers and commerce, and the benefits consumers 
receive.  A useful starting point would be for the government to fund research 
that evaluated the impact of particular legislative and regulatory initiatives.
315 
The government should also consider funding research that moves beyond 
poorly worded and biased consumer surveys.
316 The focus should instead be on 
research that would give insights into consumer preferences regarding privacy in 
ways that clarify the necessary tradeoffs and costs that privacy could entail. 
3.  The government should target laws to specific concerns, rather than passing 
broadly based legislation about protecting privacy. When the issue is couched 
broadly, who would be against online privacy protection? The problem is that 
such protections may be costly, unconstitutional, and could also lead to 
unintended consequences. We think it is more fruitful  to consider legislation 
aimed at specific issues of concern, such as highly sensitive data like Social 
Security numbers and health diagnosis records. By focusing a legislative 
                                                 
314 As SWIRE & LITAN note, “One tempting, but mistaken reaction would be immediately to demand government 
action. Experience with a wide range of public policy issues, however, has shown that merely identifying a 
market failure does not mean that the best solution is government regulation” (SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 54, at 
8). 
315 The recently enacted Gramm-Leach-Bliley and HIPAA laws are both good candidates for costs. 
316 HARPER & SINGLETON, supra note 8.  
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proposal on a particular issue, it should be easier to assess the likely costs and 
benefits of that proposal. 
4.  The government should not generally regulate matters of privacy differently 
based on whether an issue arises online or offline. Specifically, if unsolicited 
emails are to be regulated the rules should be similar to those applied to 
telemarketers.  Under current rules, individuals are responsible for screening 
telephone calls.
317 Individuals are also responsible for opting out of future 
telemarketing calls.
318 The same rules should apply to emails. In cases where the 
incremental benefits and costs of privacy protection differ substantially online 
and offline, different policy approaches may be warranted. But the working 
presumption should be in favor of treating matters of online and offline privacy 
similarly.  
5.  Providing notification of a Web site’s privacy policy is a crucial element of 
online privacy, but government regulation of notice is not warranted. The vast 
majority of commercial Web sites based in the U.S. already offer privacy policy 
notices. Moreover, businesses already have incentives to improve their notices 
of their privacy policy in order to remain competitive. The fact that Internet 
technology is changing so rapidly also argues for minimal government 
interference. Finally, there is a real risk that government regulation could 
produce privacy notices that are lengthy and legalistic. Ideally, Web sites that 
collect and use personal information should provide easy-to-find and easy-to-
read (non-legalistic) privacy policy notices. The notices should detail what 
information is collected, how it is collected, how it is used, and what kind of 
information is shared with other parties. 
6.  The government should take great care in deciding whether to prescribe 
consumer choice mechanisms, such as a requirement for explicit consumer 
approval (opt-in) before personal information may be used or shared by a Web 
site. The evidence argues for selective, but easy-to-use choice mechanisms. 
Highly sensitive information could warrant carefully crafted opt-in rules. For 
                                                 
317 They can, for example, use caller identification and blocking technologies.  
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most situations, however, providing consumers with an opportunity to stop any 
use or sharing (opt-out) would suffice, as long as the opportunity was placed at 
the point of information collection and not buried within a Web site’s privacy 
notice. Moreover, the EU experience with opt-in suggests that that it may be 
difficult to enforce a broadly based provision. 
7.  The government should not impose access requirements at this time. Granting 
consumers broad access to the personal information that companies collect for 
marketing purposes is unlikely to offer significant benefits to consumers but 
could add significant costs to doing business online. For example, it is difficult 
to see how consumers would benefit from correcting the spelling of their name 
appearing in unsolicited sales emails, or correcting their email address so that 
they receive more unsolicited emails. Some of the costs incurred by Web sites 
providing access to marketing data would eventually be passed on to consumers 
in the form of higher prices, or fewer Web sites to choose from.  
8.  The government should be careful in devising enforcement strategies for 
regulating on-line privacy. Fines should not be excessive, such as those in the 
Consumer Privacy Enhancement Act ($22,000 to $500,000 per violation). The 
government should also l imit who is allowed to bring lawsuits. Meaningful 
regulation would provide appropriate deterrence for companies without lawsuits 
that do little to help consumers. As noted earlier, states Attorney Generals, if 
allowed to bring suit, could easily end up enriching lawyers without doing much 
to help improve policy. 
9.  The government should attempt to make it easier for the public to obtain 
information on online privacy. If the public is poorly informed about ways to 
protect their privacy, the government could be helpful in lowering search costs. 
For example, the government could function as a central source of information 
on tools individuals can use to protect their privacy. Specifically, the 
government could collect information on opting-out of marketing databases in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
318 In some cases, centralized opt-out points have been established.  
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much the same way that they provide a useful Web site on preventing identity 
theft.  
The analysis of online privacy is complicated. There are difficult political, economic, 
social, legal, institutional and technological issues that must be addressed. The message of this 
paper is not that the online privacy should be unregulated, but rather that policy makers should 




                                                 
319 With due apology to Hippocrates.   71
  IV.   Appendix 
Table 1 










Explicit consumer consent for use of 
personal information (opt-in) 
 
 
High cost of switching to no sharing 
with opt-out 
 
Probably not efficient for all types of 
information because of high transaction 
costs. May be appropriate for some 
sensitive information.  
 
Tradable Rights in Personal 
Information for Individuals 
 
 
Personal information property rights 
for individuals on the Internet  
 
Information is over used because it is 
not priced properly 
 
Probably not efficient for most types of 
information because of high transaction 
costs. Rights are likely difficult to 
monitor and enforce. May be 
appropriate for some sensitive 
information.  
 
Free Flow of Information  
 
No property rights. 
Individual choice in giving out 
information. 
Collectors’ choice of use once 
information is observed 
 
 
The more information firms have, the 
better they can serve consumers 
 
Targeting is good for consumers who 
want to receive advertising, but some 
consumers may not want ads. Company 
incentives regarding privacy not always 





Case by case weighing of costs and 
benefits 
 
Because situations differ, better to 
analyze efficiency on a case-by-case 
basis 
 
Enables careful debate, but 
analysis could be expensive. Judgment 
necessary as information on benefits 
and costs is limited and uncertain. 
Could lead to seemingly ad hoc 
collection of policies   72
 
Table 2 
Selective Summary of Enacted Privacy Laws 
 
Bill Name and 
Number 




Act 1998 (S. 




Pursuant rule issued by 
the FTC requires Web 
sites that knowingly seek 
information from children 
to post privacy policies, 
provide parental 
notification of intent to 
collect information, obtain 
parental consent, provide 
parental access to child’s 
information, and establish 




Pertains only to online activity 
and applies only to children 
(under 13 years of age) 
 
Too soon to tell; the bill went into effect 
April 21, 2000.
321 
A study conducted by the University of 
Pennsylvania found that around 90 percent 
of the children's Web sites sampled are 
meeting the terms of COPPA, but it is 
unclear whether this compliance will 
provide the desired level of protection. An 
unintended consequence has been the 
reduction of interactive services for 
children–– that is fewer children’s sites 
offering free email and chat rooms.  
 
 
Compliance is to be enforced 
by FTC. States may bring 
















                                                                 
320 Children’s Online Protection Act directs the Federal Trade Commission to prescribe regulations regarding collection and use of personal information from 
children.  For final rule issued by FTC, see 64 Fed. Reg. 212 at 59888-59915. 
321 Id. at 59890.   73
 
Table 2 Continued 







                                                                 
322 Law gave Congress until Aug. 21, 1999, to pass comprehensive health privacy legislation. When Congress did not enact such legislation after three years, the 
law required the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to craft such protections by regulation.  HHS issued a final rule in Dec. 2000. See 65 FR, 
supra note 198, at 82462. HHS also issued compliance guidelines in Jul. 2001. 
323 HHS’s public advisory board, The National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, formed a Subcommittee on Privacy and Confidentiality to monitor 
major developments in health information privacy and make recommendations to the full Committee and assist the Department on implementation of the 
health information privacy provisions of HIPAA.  Subcommittee held hearings to discuss implementation HIPAA on Aug. 21-23, 2001.  For testimonies see,  
National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, Agenda of August 21-23 (visited Oct. 25, 2001) <http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/010821ag.htm >.  
324  Department of Health and Human Services,  HHS Fact Sheet: Protecting the Privacy of Patients’ Health Information  (visited Oct. 25, 2001) 
<http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/01fsprivacy.html>.    
325 Delegated by Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in letter published in Federal Register on Dec. 8, 2000.  See 65 FR, supra note 
198, at 82381. 
Bill Name and 
Number 





Accountability Act of 





Pursuant federal regulation requires 
medical units to obtain patient 
consent before disclosing 
information, requires that patients 
be provided with access to their 
information, that personnel be hired 
to comply with rules, and defines 




Applies to health information. 
Text of bill contains no explicit 
reference to the Internet, but 
will affect online health sites. 
 
Too soon to tell. The HHS-issued 
privacy rule took effect on April 14, 
2001, but most entities have two full 
years to comply with rule. Recent 
testimony by health care 
professionals reveals that there is 
widespread concern in the industry 
that the full implementation of 
HIPAA privacy provisions will 
obstruct access to health care 
information needed for legitimate 






provisions of bill 
delegated to DHHS’s 
Office for Civil 
Rights. Criminal and 
civil penalties that 
pertain to specific 
behavior specified in 
HHS regulation.
325   74
 
Table 2 Continued 




                                                                 
326 Jones Telecommunications and Multimedia Encyclopedia,  Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Criticism of ECPA (visited Oct. 25, 2001) 
<http://www.digitalcentury.com/encyclo/update/ecpa.html#Criticism >.  
Bill Name and Number  Description  Specific Applications  Does Bill Fulfill Purpose?  Enforcement Provisions 
 
Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 
1999 (S. 900)  (Gramm-
Leach-Bliley, or GLB) 
 
Regulates the use by interactive 
computer services of personally 
identifiable information provided by 
subscribers. 
 
Applies only to financial 
institutions. Pertains to online and 
offline privacy.  
 
One study estimates that the act has 
had no effect on insurance companies 
because the industry anticipated the 
legislation and had already changed 
its practices accordingly. In 
compliance with GLB, around 40,000 
financial institutions have mailed 
approx. 2.5 billion privacy policy 
notices to consumers, and households 
received 20 to 50 different notices. 
The cost of the mailings thus far is 
between $2 and $5 billion. 
 
 
Violations are to be 
enforced by the FTC, 
"federal functional 
regulators, the State 
insurance authorities, 
and the Federal Trade 
Commission" under 
various laws. Maximum 




Act of 1986 (H.R. 4952) 
(ECPA) 
 
Amended in 1996 
by The 
Telecommunications Act  
 
Extends the federal prohibition 
against the unauthorized interception 
of communications to include specific 
types of electronic communications, 
criminalizes unauthorized access to 
electronic communications facilities. 
 
Applies to electronic 
communications only. Pertains to 
online and offline privacy. 
 
While the ECPA was designed to 
protect the content of electronic 
communications, it redefined content 
to specifically exclude the existence 
of the communication itself, as well as 
the identity of the parties involved.
326 
The Telecomm. Act largely corrects 
this criticism of the ECPA by adding 
protections for the existence of a 




punishable by fine 
and/or prison sentences. 
Defines maximum 
prison sentences for 
certain circumstances.     75
 
Table 3 
Selective Summary of Proposed Privacy Laws 
 
Bill Name and Number  Description of Privacy-related Provisions  Evaluation 
1.  Bills Targeting Sensitive Information 
 
Financial Information Privacy Protection Act (S. 
30) 
 
Bill would amend Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) by 
preventing disclosure of any “nonpublic personal 
information to an affiliate or a nonaffiliated third 
party” without providing notice and a chance to 
opt-out. Sensitive financial transactions records 
and health data would require opt-in consent. 
 
 
Separation of opt-out for non-sensitive data and 
opt-in for sensitive data is commendable. FTC 
authority to stay state action would help to limit  
state rent seeking.  
 
Freedom From Behavioral Profiling Act of 2000 
(S. 536) 
 
Amends GLB Act by limiting the sharing of 
marketing and behavioral profiling information for 
the purpose of marketing “non-financial products” 
to consumers without opt-in consent. 
 
Marketing of financial products would be 
unaffected. Opt-in requirement for marketing data 
used to sell “non-financial products” excessive. 
 
 
Personal Information Privacy Act of 2001 (H.R. 
1478)  
 
Protects the privacy of Social Security Numbers 
and other personal information. Sets civil 
monetary penalties at $25,000 to $50,000 per 
violation. 
 
Social Security numbers need special protection. 
The bill may not lower rate of identity theft 
because typical theft involves a stolen wallet. 
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Table 3 Continued 
Selective Summary of Proposed Privacy Laws 
 
Bill Name and Number  Description of Privacy Related Provisions  Evaluation 
2.  Bills Identifying Offensive Materials 
 
Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited 




Requires unsolicited email senders to include 
notice in the email header that mail is unsolicited; 
unsolicited email must include a return address and 
an easy-to-use opt-out mechanism. 
 
Not likely to reduce spam. Legitimate marketers 
will comply, but the worst offenders could 
easily locate outside of the U.S. to avoid 
regulation. 
 




Similar to CAN SPAM, but would also allow 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to set rules 
regarding unsolicited email, regardless of 
subscribers’ preferences. Fines range from $500 
per violation with a maximum of $5,000. 
 
 
It is unclear whether ISPs have better tools to 
screen out unsolicited emails than consumers 
have. Bypassing consumer choice will harm 
some. 
3. Bills Prohibiting Consumer Profiling 
 
Electronic Privacy Protection Act (H.R. 112)  
 
Requires companies distributing “information 
collection devices” that transmit data over the 
Internet back to the manufacturer (or that collect 
data without consumers actively supplying it) to 
disclose such activity and obtain user consent. 
Violators face fines of $500 to $1,500. 
 
 
The notice and opt-in rules are limited to 
“information collection devices;” software is 
included, but cookies are specifically exempted. 
Without notice, consumers could be subjected to 
surreptitious data collection. 
 
The Spyware Control and Privacy Protection Act 
of 2001 (S. 197) (Applies only to 'spyware' 
computer programs) 
 
Any software that “includes a capability to collect 
information” must provide notice and opt-in 
consent. Requires the software company to list all 
information subject to collection and access. 
Violators could face private law suits. 
 
 
The rules requiring access to all recipients of 
data would be very costly to administer and 
would not provide significant consumer 
benefit. Private law suits could lead to 
excessive litigation. 
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Table 3 Continued 
Selective Summary of Proposed Privacy Laws 
 
Bill Name and Number  Description of Privacy Related Provisions  Evaluation 
4. Bills Providing Comprehensive Information Privacy Protection 
 




Requires Web sites to provide notice, including a 
description of the categories of likely recipients of 
the information. Requires opt-out. Fines for 
violators range from $22,000 to $500,000. 
 
Applies only to Web sites and would thus create a 
different standard for online versus offline data 
use. Fines are excessive in relation to potential 
violations. Could lead to excessive litigation.  
 
 
Online Privacy Protection Act of 2001 (HR 89) 
 
Requires the FTC to issue regulations mandating 
privacy disclosures on Web sites, allowing for 
either opt-out or opt-in for third party disclosures 
and allowing access to personal data. 
 
Requiring opt-in for all personal information is 
unjustified. Just as above, treating online and 




Consumer Online Privacy and Disclosure Act 
(HR 347) 
 
Prohibits correlating computer address information 
with personal information, allowing third party 
cookie use to develop personal profiles without 
opt-in consent, or the selling of transactional 
information as a means to satisfy creditors. 
 
Cookies provide consumers with genuine benefits; 
requiring opt-in consent does not seem justified in 
this case. The bill allows private law suits and 
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Table 4 
Estimated Impact of Privacy Legislation 
 
Description of Impact  Monetized Estimate 
 
Estimated Cost of Providing Notice: 
 
40,000 financial institutions sent approximately 2.5 billion notices to 
customers to comply with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
327 
 
$2 billion to $5 billion 
 
 
Estimated Cost of Providing Choice: 
 




$30 per customer  
 
 
The Department of Health and Human Services estimated the 
discounted, ten-year compliance cost to the health care industry to meet 





$11.8 billion over ten years (discounted) 
 
 
Estimated Cost of Providing Access:  
 
The British Bankers’ Association calculated the cost of providing one 
customer with a report mandated by the EU directive for data 
protection.330 
 





                                                                 
327 CATE (1997), supra note 4, at 53. 
328 U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, supra note 272; and, CATE & STATEN (2001), supra note 68.  
329 $11.8 billion figure was calculated in 2003 dollars. The 10 year period estimated is 2003-2012.  An 11.2 percent discount rate was used, comprised of a 7 
percent real rate and a 4.2 percent projected rate of inflation over the 2003-2012 period. See 65 FR, supra note 198 at 82670-82761.   
330 CATE (1997), supra note 4, at 45 (citing The Home Office Consultation Paper on the Implementation of the EU Data Protection Directive—The British 




Table 4 Continued 
Estimated Impact of Privacy Legislation 
 
Description of Impact  Monetized Estimate 
 
Estimated Cost of Providing Access, continued:  
 
Credit reporting agencies spend over $100 million on technology expenses 
that are largely driven by the FCRA mandate that requires consumer access 
to their credit reports and timely correction of erroneous data.
331 
 
More than $100 million 
 
Hahn estimated the implementation cost to Web site operators of complying 
with stringent access provisions like those found in the Spyware bill.
 332,333 
 




The Department of Health and Human Services estimated cost of compliance 
with the final rule over ten years, 2003–2012. This includes the cost of all the 





$17.6 billion over ten years, 2003–2012. The net present value is $11.8 
billion.335 
 
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that implementing The Financial 






Between $500,000 and $1 million a year for five years 
                                                                 
331 KITCHENMAN, supra note 144  
332 Hahn, supra note 300, at 23. 
333 In 2001 dollars.  
334 In its regulatory impact analysis that accompanied the promulgation of the privacy rule required by HIPAA, 
335 A discount rate of 11.2 percent was used for the calculation. See 65 FR, supra note 198, at 82760. 
336H.R. 4321 Financial Information Privacy Act of 1998, Congressional Budget Office (visited September 19, 2001) 
<http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=905&sequence=0&from=6>. 
337 In 1998 dollars.   80
 
 
Table 4 continued 
Estimated Impact of Privacy Legislation 
 
Description of Impact  Monetized Estimate 
 
Estimated Cost of Providing Access, continued: 
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that “the various costs of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley legislation related to consumer protection, the 
Community Reinvestment Act, and eliminating the Savings Association 






$1 million increase per year per agency, for three agencies (total of $3 million 
per year) 
 
Estimated Benefits currently yielded by current absence of privacy 
legislation: 
 
American consumers save on mortgage loans because of the liquidity that 
credit bureau information makes possible.
339 
 
$80 billion a year 
 
Information sharing by the 90 largest financial institutions provides benefits 
of $195 per household per year through: marketing savings that are passed 
on to consumers, discounts on services that result from arrangements with 
third parties, specialized offers to specific consumers, discounts offered by 




$195 per household 
 
                                                                 
338 In 1999 dollars. Note that the cited CBO estimate is an estimate of different regulatory costs associated with Gramm-Leach-Bliley, not just of the bill’s  
    privacy provisions.  See S. 900 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Congressional Budget Office (visited September 19, 2001) 
<http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1781&sequence=0&from=6>. 
339 CATE (1997), supra note 4, at 11 (citing, KITCHENMAN, supra note 144, at 7). 
340 GLASSMAN, supra note 50.  
341 Dollar year not specified. 
342 GLASSMAN also estimates that information sharing by the same 90 largest financial institutions saves the average household 4 hours per year by facilitating a 
centralized call center shared by the financial institutions, one website that can be used for multiple accounts with different institutions, and pre-filled 
application forms that can be used by different institutions. See GLASSMAN, supra note 50. 